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Rethinking the Tripartite Division
of American Work Law
Richard Michael Fischlt
In this Article, Professor Fischl argues that the boundaries separating
the constituent subjects of American work law-employment discrimination,
labor law, and employment law-are becoming increasingly porous, and he
explores two distinct but related dimensions of this accelerating integration
of the field. He offers numerous examples of "doctrinal integration,"
settings in which nominally out-of-area law plays a significant role in
governing contemporary work law topics. He then explores 'functional
integration," demonstrating that the institutions central to employment
discrimination and labor law-discrimination litigation and labor unions,
respectively-have increasingly assumed functions traditionally played by
the other. He argues that functional integration is apparent as well in the
increasingly robust role of employment law in both employment
discrimination and labor law contexts. Against the backdrop of these
developments, Professor Fischl contends, the continued embrace of the
conventional subject-matter division reflects and reinforces an increasingly
false opposition between the struggle for workplace democracy and the
struggle for racial, gender, and other forms of workplace justice.
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I.
POP QuIz
Match each of the items listed in Column A with the corresponding
item or items in Column B:
Column A Column B
* employment 0 the law of sexual harassment
discrimination
* labor law * legal protection for
workplace protests
" employment law * the employment-at-will rule
The items in Column A will be readily familiar to most readers, for
they represent the "holy trinity" of contemporary American labor and
employment law: employment discrimination (the law prohibiting
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, gender, age, etc.); labor
law (the law governing union organizing, collective bargaining, and union-
member relations); and employment law (the large and growing body of
common and statutory law governing the individual employment
relationship).
The connection between the members of the trinity and their horizontal
counterparts in Column B is likely obvious to most readers as well. In
American law, sexual harassment is prohibited as a form of gender
discrimination, and sexual harassment cases make up a significant portion
of the claims filed under federal and state employment discrimination laws.
Workplace protests receive their most familiar protection from Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act ("the NLRA"), which guarantees
employees the right to engage in a host of transgressions-from circulating
petitions to participating in strikes and picketing-undertaken for the
purpose of "mutual aid or protection." As for employment at will-the
common law rule under which employer and employee alike are free to part
ways "for good cause or bad cause, or even for no cause"-it is no
exaggeration to say that the rule and relatively recent changes to it are the
central feature of what has come to be known as employment law.
But don't let the readily apparent horizontal matches mislead you; on
closer examination, it turns out that each of the topics in Column B
"matches" not just one but all three of the areas of law listed in Column A.
Thus, sexual harassment looms large not only in employment
discrimination law but also in labor law, where alleged perpetrators may
bring "just cause" challenges to punishment meted out by the employer and
where alleged victims may have grievable claims as well. Sexual
2007
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harassment looms larger still in employment law, where once again alleged
victims and alleged perps alike may find refuge. Tort claims like
intentional infliction of emotional distress are frequently deployed by
plaintiffs-either as damages-enhancing pendent claims in a Title VII
action or as stand-alone claims when the requirements of Title VII cannot
be met-and defamation or wrongful discharge actions may in a variety of
circumstances be available to those who claim to have been wrongly
accused.
Turning to workplace protests, legal protection may be available today
not only under Section 7 of the NLRA, but also from the anti-retaliation
provisions of most employment discrimination statutes (which typically
protect those who "oppose" discriminatory workplace practices) as well as
from such employment law sources as whistleblower statutes (which
typically protect employees who "object to" or "refuse to participate in"
unlawful employer activities). And the employment-at-will rule plays a
role in employment discrimination and in labor law that is every bit as
robust as the one it plays in employment law, providing employers with
what is typically their most effective defense against discharge claims
arising under either Title VII or the NLRA.
I will offer a more detailed picture of these connections in a bit, but the
results of the quiz provide a fair glimpse of the development that is the
central focus of this Article: For those who practice American labor and
employment law-and indeed for the workers, unions, and employers
whose interests are most directly at stake-the boundaries that have defined
the tripartite division of the field are becoming increasingly porous, and as a
result it is no longer possible, if indeed it was ever possible, to understand
the constituent subjects in isolation from one another.
This development has not gone entirely unnoticed in the American
legal academy. Indeed, two recently published casebooks attempt to
combine employment discrimination, labor law, and employment law
materials for integrated study,' following the path of a well-known earlier
effort now in its third edition.2 Likewise, the newest addition to the
employment law library incorporates discrimination and labor law themes
and materials throughout its broad survey of workplace regulation.3
There is even a name for the emerging whole that is increasingly more,
and more complex, than the sum of its parts: "work law" or "the law of
work."4 The new formulation signals the integrative effort far better than
"labor and employment law," a shorthand expression that has always
i. KENNETH M. CASEBEER & GARY MINDA, WORK LAW IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2005);
MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2005).
2. ROBERT J. RABIN ET AL., LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES AND
MATERIALS IN THE LAW OF WORK (3d ed. 2002).
3. RICHARD CARLSON, EMPLOYMENT LAW (2005).
4. See, e.g., supra notes 1 & 2.
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sounded more like a list than a unified subject-a list, moreover, sorely in
need of diversity training, omitting as it does discrimination from an
otherwise complete inventory. So "work law" it is, at least for the
remainder of this Article.5
It is no criticism of these texts to observe that they have relatively little
to say about why and how the conventional subject-matter division of the
field has lost its purchase on contemporary practice. The preface of a
casebook designed for a student audience is not, after all, the place one
would ordinarily expect to find an extended analysis of the sort I am
offering here, and so it is no surprise that relatively conclusory statements
about the futility of studying any one of the conventional subjects in
isolation from the others is the most we typically get.6 Moreover, these
texts have other pedagogically valuable points of emphasis-from
providing analyses of how particular issues are addressed through different
institutions and legal structures,7 to examining demographic and labor
market developments with implications for the entire field,8 to exploring the
political economy of the confluence of laws governing the law of work.9
They have thus contributed enormously to breaking a powerful mold, and
they have also succeeded admirably in rendering the interaction between the
conventional subject-matter regimes more visible, no mean feat. But they
have only begun the task of mapping and accounting for the legal and
institutional developments that are reconfiguring our field.
More surprising, perhaps, is the virtual absence of any sustained
discussion of these developments in our scholarly efforts. To be sure, those
in the work law field have been writing across disciplinary boundaries for
some time, insightfully exploring various topics that do not fit neatly within
5. The new formulation is not without its own problems. As the term is used by most lawyers
and academics, "work" typically refers to paid work (thus excluding a host of unpaid care-work
activities shouldered primarily by women) and excludes a variety of subsistence activities undertaken by
the ostensibly "unemployed." See Joanne Conaghan, Work, Family, and the Discipline of Labour Law,
and Lucy Williams, Poor Women's Work Experiences: Gaps in the 'Work-Family' Discussion, in
LABOUR LAW, WORK, AND FAMILY: CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Joanne Conaghan &
Kerry Rittich eds., 2005). I will have more to say about those exclusions-and a number of others-in a
sequel to this Article, Richard Michael Fischl, A Critique of the Contemporary Work Law Curriculum
(forthcoming 2007).
6. See, e.g., CRAIN ET AL., supra note 1, at xiii ("These legal regimes overlap and relate to one
another in complex ways that are obscured by categorical study"); CARLSON, supra note 3, at xxiv
("Naturally, antidiscrimination law and the potential for collective bargaining permeate every aspect of
employment with complexity that deserves the opportunity for further study in more specialized courses.
But it is impossible to isolate these topics from examination of any other part of employment law, and a
course that purported to do so would hardly serve as a representative survey.").
7. See CARLSON, supra note 3, chs. 2 (definition of employee), 3 (hiring practices), 4
(compensation and benefits), 8 (job security), & 10 (dispute resolution); CRAIN ET AL., supra note 1, chs.
3 & 6 (job security), 9 (employee voice), & 15 (arbitration of workplace disputes); RABIN ET AL., supra
note 2, chs. 3 (health and safety) & 4 (economic security and capital mobility issues).
8. See CRAIN ET AL., supra note 1, ch. 2.
9. See CASEBEER & MINDA, supra note 1, passim.
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any one of the conventional subjects.'" But very little has been said about
how contemporary lawyers are increasingly practicing across those
boundaries or the resulting discontinuity between "the law on the books"-
in this case meaning the law as we legal academics portray it-and "the law
in action."
Yet it is not my aim here to argue that contemporary work law is
"really" a unified field and no longer three separate and distinct areas of
law. Each of the conventional subjects is associated with its own statutes,
case law traditions, specialized administrative agencies and procedures, and
separately organized and indexed practitioner research tools. Indeed, there
is more than enough in each instance to fill a three-credit law school course,
a gaggle of seminars, and a lifetime's worth of CLE sessions. Nor should
the emergence of "borderline cases" that straddle conventional doctrinal
boundaries come as big news. The subjects we teach in American law
schools, in work law and elsewhere, are invariably works-in-progress.
Categories overlap, boundaries shift and blur, and all the while the real
world serves up situations that blithely traverse the most carefully drawn
lawyerly or philosophical distinctions.
In their inception, of course, the three conventional work law subjects
were in each case a response to developments in the field; there was
something new to study and-voila!-there were scholars studying it,
courses teaching it, conferences devoted to it, and eventually even an AALS
section bearing its name and a flurry of eponymous commercial study
guides." But academic practices frequently take on a life of their own, and
the frames of reference they produce may eventually obscure more than
they reveal. Indeed, though we often speak of the subjects we teach as if
they were the products of nature or irresistible logic, they are far more
frequently artifacts of history, convention, imagination, and not the least
contestation. Like other legal concepts deployed by lawyers and academics
alike, they are arguments, designed to persuade a particular audience about
the way the world is and, in no small measure, the way we think it ought to
be. The important question is therefore one of framing and emphasis:
10. See, e.g., Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988) (examining race and gender issues that come
into play in the application of workplace tort doctrines such as intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of
Title VII and the NLRA-Not!, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 395 (1993) (analyzing the confluence of
employment discrimination and labor law doctrines that deny self-representation to working women of
color); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 319, 325 (2005) (proposing an institutionalized role for employee participation in employer self-
regulation processes that would "straddl[e] the conventional divide between labor law and employment
law").
11. I offer a more nuanced account of these developments in Fischl, A Critique of the
Contemporary Work Law Curriculum, supra note 5.
RETHINKING AMERICAN WORK LAW
What do we highlight, and what do we obscure, by embracing one
organization and rejecting others?
Simply put, the discrete lenses provided by the conventional subject-
matter trinity make it difficult to bring into focus two distinct but related
dimensions of what I will refer to as the accelerating integration of
American work law. Thus, we are on the one hand experiencing an
accelerating doctrinal integration of our field, as the settings in which
nominally out-of-area law plays a significant governance role are rapidly
proliferating. Those settings include not only the topics covered in the pop
quiz (sexual harassment, workplace protest law, and employment at will)
but also a number of others-from the enforcement of individual arbitration
agreements to the rules governing the interpretation and effect of employee
handbooks-that are similarly central to the contemporary practice of work
law.
We are likewise increasingly confronting a functional integration of
work law, a development evident in what I will refer to as the "cross-
migration" of employment discrimination law and labor law, as the
institutions central to each field-discrimination litigation and labor unions,
respectively-have increasingly assumed functions traditionally played by
the other. Functional integration is apparent as well in the robust role of
employment law in employment discrimination litigation (where
employment law claims are frequently deployed by alleged victims and
perpetrators alike) as well as in labor law (where such claims are
increasingly deployed in the context of organizing and representational
efforts).
Against the backdrop of these developments, our continued embrace of
the conventional subject-matter division reflects and reinforces an
increasingly false opposition between legal strategies that rely on workplace
organizing and collective action (on the one hand) and those that rely on
litigation and related institutional practices (on the other). More
fundamentally, the conventional division reflects and reinforces an
increasingly false opposition between the struggle for workplace democracy
and the struggle for racial, gender, and other forms of justice in the
workplace and beyond.
There is obviously more at stake here than casebook or curriculum
content, important as they may be; indeed, in a work-in-progress, I consider
the implications of the argument I am making for the way we present the
law of work to American law students.12 But my sights are set on a
somewhat different target in this Article. Bear in mind that the tripartite
subject-matter division framed the way most legal academics were
introduced to the law of work. It organized the courses we took in law
school and, until relatively recently, it organized much of the practice of
12. See id.
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work law as well. When we entered the legal academy, it organized our
teaching assignments and thus continued to influence the way we approach
the subject in our daily lives. Scholarly conferences, panels, and symposia
have almost invariably been organized around the division as well, and the
work law curriculum at the lion's share of American law schools continues
to be organized in that way. So it is hardly a coincidence that most of us
continue to teach and write as if the conventional subject-matter boundaries
remain intact, a habit with less than salutary consequences for the way we
think about-as well as the way we influence practitioners and
practitioners-to-be to think about---developments in our field that have
begun to render those boundaries obsolete.
What might we learn about the contemporary law of work if we ignore
those dissipating boundaries?
II.
LOOK, MA, No BORDERS:
THE DOCTRINAL INTEGRATION OF AMERICAN WORK LAW
As the results of the pop quiz suggest, the conventional division has
lost much of its purchase on the practice of work law, and the number of
contexts requiring a thoroughgoing familiarity with the law and/or legal
institutions associated with two or even all three of the conventional work
law subjects is steadily increasing. I want to explore two distinct but not
unrelated dimensions of this accelerating integration of the field, turning in
this part of the Article to examples of what I'll refer to as "doctrinal
integration" (settings in which the rules governing a particular legal issue
are drawn from multiple subjects) and, in the next part, to examples of what
I will refer to as "functional" or "institutional integration" (settings in which
legal institutions are playing out-of-area roles).
The accelerating integration of doctrinal materials is characterized by
several closely related developments. Thus, allegations of employer
misconduct increasingly give rise to the possibility of multiple or
alternative claims drawn from across the boundaries of the conventional
work law subjects, with important implications for the availability of
particular remedies and for choice of forum. (Recall in this connection the
sexual harassment and workplace protest illustrations in our pop quiz,
where in each case liability was potentially governed by rules drawn from
all three conventional subjects.) Moreover, parties increasingly find
themselves subject to conflicting obligations that are likewise oblique to the
conventional subject-matter boundaries. As a result, efforts to chart a safe
passage are complicated by the fact that Scylla and Charibdis may not
appear together on the same map. (Recall once again our sexual harassment
RETHINKING AMERICAN WORK LA W
illustration, where employer efforts to avoid or mitigate employment
discrimination claims might generate labor law or employment law claims
on the part of the alleged perpetrators.) The task for the parties and their
lawyers is complicated further still by the fact that the rules governing
particular legal topics are increasingly influenced and in many cases even
treated as controlled by out-of-area case law. In particular, common law
doctrines conventionally associated with employment law-the
"background" rules of contract, tort, and property-have emerged to play a
vital role in the application of the statutes and doctrines that govern
employment discrimination and labor law cases. (Recall here our
employment-at-will illustration and the important role that this centerpiece
of employment law plays in discharge cases under Title VII and the
NLRA.)
These phenomena are increasingly evident in a variety of work law
topics. I will address a number of those topics here, beginning with those
covered in our pop quiz (sexual harassment, workplace protests, and
employment at will) and then proceeding to consider a number of others
(proof of motive in discharge cases, mandatory individual arbitration, and
employee handbooks). What the selected topics have in common-beyond
their value in illustrating the accelerating doctrinal integration of work
law-is that each lies at the heart of contemporary practice, looming large
in the day-to-day experience of practitioners and clients alike.
A. Sexual Harassment
I begin with the regulation of sexual harassment, for some time a
central feature of American employment discrimination law.13 Yet in
contemporary practice, discrimination doctrine is only one dimension of
sexual harassment law; labor law and employment law play important roles
as well, for sources associated with each of those areas create important
additional vehicles for challenging harassment as well as potentially
countervailing protection for alleged perpetrators.
1. Labor Law and Sexual Harassment
Labor law first. Most contemporary collective-bargaining agreements
have both an antidiscrimination provision (whereby the employer and the
union both agree not to discriminate against employees on the basis of race,
gender, national origin, etc.) and a "just cause" provision (whereby the
employer promises not to discipline or discharge any employee in its
13. For the ten-year period ending in 2006, between 12,000 and 16,000 charges alleging sexual
harassment under Title VII were filed each year with the EEOC and various state and local fair
employment practices agencies. See SEXUAL HARASSMENT CHARGES-EEOC & FEPAs COMBINED:
FY 1997- FY 2006 (table), http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html.
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absence).' 4 Allegations of sexual harassment may be grievable under either
or both provisions. Thus, antidiscrimination clauses typically take the form
of an express commitment to abide by applicable antidiscrimination statutes
and regulations, in effect incorporating the law of sexual harassment by
reference. Sexual harassment that results in adverse action-typically "quid
pro quo" harassment, where the victim refuses to accede to a supervisor's
sexual demands and suffers the consequences-provides a straightforward
"just cause" claim, and "hostile work environment" harassment that drives a
victim to depart the firm, or to perform poorly enough to prompt dismissal,
may be challenged under "just cause" principles as well. 5
As it happens, each of the relevant contractual provisions is itself in no
small measure a reaction to legal incentives created by sources external to
labor law. Thus, antidiscrimination provisions may help both parties to
establish their bona fides as equal employment opportunity institutions, and
a refusal by either party to agree to one during collective bargaining could
constitute damning evidence in any subsequent discrimination litigation;
indeed, securing an antidiscrimination provision in collective bargaining is
an obvious goal of any employer or union that puts a premium on either the
fact or the appearance of EEO compliance. For their part, "just cause"
provisions are high on the list of benefits that drive union-organizing
campaigns-and are at or near the top of a union's demands in first-contract
bargaining-precisely because job security is so hard to come by in a non-
union setting, where the common law employment-at-will doctrine almost
invariably governs.' 6
Although many sexual harassment claims thus are at least potentially
grievable, American unions have frequently failed to pursue them, focusing
instead on the plight of alleged perpetrators when the latter are fellow
members of the bargaining unit; indeed, challenges to the discipline or
discharge of alleged perpetrators have been a prolific source of "just cause"
arbitrations. 7 But this state of affairs is in no small measure the product of
incentives created by a confluence of legal doctrines--drawn from
14. See BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 7, 127 (14th ed. 1995) (antidiscrimination
provisions appear in 87% of the collective-bargaining agreements sampled, and "cause" or "just cause"
provisions appear in 92% of such agreements).
15. See, e.g., Exxon Co. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
846 (1995) (finding dismissal for poor work performance grievable where performance was response to
pattern of sexual harassment).
16. See Richard Michael Fischl, A Domain into Which the King's Writ Does Not Seek to Run:
Workplace Justice in the Shadow of Employment-at- Will, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 253, 274-75 (Joanne Conaghan et
al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Fischl, Workplace Justice].
17. The classic study on this important topic is Marion Crain, Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile
Work Environment Sexual Harassment: The Untold Story, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 9, 29-44 (1995); see
also Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrating Sexual Harassment Grievances: A Representation Dilemma for
Unions, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1 (1999); Ann C. Hodges, Strategies for Combating Sexual
Harassment: The Role of Labor Unions, 15 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 183 (2006).
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employment discrimination as well as labor law-that govern the topic of
sexual harassment.
For one thing, alleged sexual harassment perpetrators in union firms
have no place to go to protect their jobs except arbitration. By contrast,
alleged victims have the option under a venerable discrimination law
precedent of pressing their Title VII claims in a judicial forum, thereby
avoiding representation by a potentially less-than-enthusiastic union and at
the same time earning a shot at punitive damages, which are seldom
available in the arbitral forum.'8
In the meantime, faced with the prospect of such liability, unionized
employers, like their non-union counterparts, have exhibited an increasing
tendency to focus their efforts on eradicating "sex" from the workplace
rather than on fighting "harassment," subtle or otherwise, intended to put
working women in their place.' 9 Such efforts may result in discharge for
rank-and-file employees who are guilty of little more than poor judgment or
clueless romantic advances and who would in other circumstances receive
warnings, training, and discipline other than banishment for a first offense;
indeed, many "just cause" arbitrations present situations that appear to fall
in this category.2" Yet employment discrimination law plays a further
complicating role here, furnishing the basis for "public policy" challenges
to "perpetrator-friendly" arbitral decisions-challenges, as one scholar has
demonstrated, that succeed with impressive frequency.2
It should nevertheless be noted that recent trends may well prompt
labor unions to adopt a more even-handed approach to sexual harassment
cases. American unions are increasingly representing bargaining units in
which women are a substantial or even a majority presence-a development
that will get more attention in Part III of the Article-and they are not
achieving those gains by ignoring the concerns of this vital and growing
constituency. It is thus increasingly common to find unions securing and
18. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that union-represented
employees may pursue discrimination claims in court and thus circumvent the arbitral forum). On the
prospect of punitive damages in litigation versus arbitration, see Reginald Alleyne, supra note 17, at 5-6.
19. For an extremely perceptive account, see Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE
L.J. 2061 (2003).
20. See, e.g., Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union ex rel. Local Union 676, 171
F.3d 971, 972-74 (4th Cir. 1999) (upholding arbitrator's decision to reduce discharge to nine month
suspension without pay, where perpetrator had good work record and no prior instances of harassment
during nearly twenty years of employment, and where employer had failed to follow usual course of
progressive discipline, counseling, and supervision); Weber Aircraft Inc. v. General Warehousemen
Union Local 767, 253 F.3d 821, 823 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding arbitrator's decision to reduce
discharge to eleven-month suspension without pay, where perpetrator was twenty-five year employee
with record of "valuable service" and whose only instance of prior discipline was reversed in
arbitration).
21. Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons
from the Case Law, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 91, 117 (2000) (collecting cases). For examples of
cases where such challenges did not succeed, see supra note 20.
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enforcing collective-bargaining provisions that explicitly prohibit sexual
harassment, though any resulting increase in sexual harassment arbitrations
may be offset by a reduction in the frequency of offensive conduct
encountered in more heavily female workplaces.
Two legal developments-each once again with a source in
employment discrimination rather than labor law-may contribute to this
equalizing trend. First, unions increasingly face the prospect of Title VII
liability for their failure to pursue the harassment claims of those victims
who do attempt to invoke the arbitral process.22 Moreover, it is entirely
possible that sexual harassment victims will soon be required to press their
claims through arbitration rather than litigation-another topic I will
address elsewhere 23-and this too is likely to bring the union representation
of victims and perpetrators closer to equipoise.
2. Employment Law and Sexual Harassment
Turning, then, to employment law, here also employers face the
prospect of liability from both victims and perpetrators. Cases involving
allegations of sexual harassment were prominent among the first generation
of decisions limiting the scope of the employment-at-will rule, providing
victims with a vehicle for challenging harassment before such claims won
authoritative recognition under discrimination law.24  Today, harassment
that leads to termination is actionable in many jurisdictions under "abusive
discharge" theories.2 ' Harassment-with or without discharge-may also
be actionable under theories such as intentional infliction of emotional
distress, 26 assault and battery, 27 false imprisonment,28 defamation,29 and
invasion of privacy." Given the relatively low caps on compensatory and
punitive damages established by Title VII, and the difficulties of securing
22. See Hodges, supra note 17, at 205-06 (collecting cases).
23. See infra Part II.E. 1.
24. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (discharge for declining
supervisor's demand for a date); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985)
(en bane) (discharge for refusing to participate in public indecency). The Supreme Court did not put its
imprimatur on sexual harassment liability under Title VII until Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986).
25. See, e.g., Insignia Residential Corp. v. Ashton, 755 A.2d 1080 (Md. 2000); Collins v. Rizkana,
652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995).
26. See, e.g., Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1555-56 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Rogers v. Lowes
L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 529-31 (D.D.C. 1981); O'Reilly v. Executone of Albany, Inc.,
503 N.Y.S.2d 185 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
27. See, e.g., Stockett, 791 F. Supp. at 1555-56; Rogers, 526 F. Supp. at 529; Priest v. Rotary, 634
F. Supp. 571, 584 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
28. See, e.g., Stockett, 791 F. Supp. at 1555-56; Priest, 634 F. Supp. at 583-84.
29. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1179, 1190-92 (D.N.H. 1992);
Frederick v. Reed Smith Shaw & McClay, No. 92-0592, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1809, 1994 WL 57213
(E.D. Pa. 1994).
30. See, e.g., Stockett, 791 F. Supp. at 1555-56; Rogers, 526 F. Supp. at 528.
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punitive damages under the governing case law, victims of harassment will
frequently deploy common law theories such as these as pendent claims in
their discrimination actions.3' Moreover, given Title VII's exclusion of
small employers and its extremely short statute of limitations, recourse to
the common law may be the only avenue available for aggrieved parties in a
variety of circumstances.32 To complicate matters further, common law
actions otherwise available to supplement federal discrimination claims
may be pre-empted under the terms of state antidiscrimination statutes,
providing yet another source of interplay between the two bodies of law.33
At the same time, employer efforts to prevent or punish sexual
harassment, whether undertaken simply to avoid liability or for other
reasons, may likewise implicate employment law. Thus, allegations of
sexual harassment may generate state common law claims for defamation,
malicious prosecution, or intentional infliction of emotional distress based
on accusations made in connection with investigation or discipline,34 and
adverse actions by the employer against alleged perpetrators may even draw
breach of contract claims.35
In sum, lawyers who handle sexual harassment cases in contemporary
practice must be thoroughly familiar with both Title VII-still the principal
source of sexual harassment law-and a confluence of doctrines from all
three conventional subjects that can raise or change the stakes of a
particular claim considerably.
B. The Law of Workplace Protests
The classic source of legal protection for workplace protests is Section
7 of the NLRA, which covers a host of "concerted activities"-such as
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (2000) (establishing limits on aggregated compensatory and
punitive damages at $50,000 for employers with 15 - 100 employees; $100,000 for employers with 101
- 200 employees; $200,000 for employers with 201-500 employees; and $300,000 for employers with
more than 500 employees). On the standard required for securing punitive damages, see Kolstad v. Am.
Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 530 (1999) (limiting punitive damages "to cases in which the employer has
engaged in intentional discrimination and has done so with 'malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual') (citation omitted).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining covered employers as those regularly employing 15 or
more employees); id. § 2000e-5(e) (imposing 180-day statute of limitations for filing charge under
statute).
33. See ROBERT BELTON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 472-74 (7th ed. 2004) (collecting cases).
34. See, e.g., Meloff v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (defamation); see
generally Ruth A. Kennedy, Insulating Sexual Harassment Grievance Procedures from the Chilling
Effect of Defamation Litigation, 69 WASH. L. REv. 235 (1994).
35. See, e.g., Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 17 Cal. 4th 93 (1998) (challenging discharge
for alleged sexual harassment by way of contract claim based on written assurances of job security made
by employer during pre-hire negotiations).
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strikes, picketing, petitioning, and the like-undertaken for the purpose of
"mutual aid or protection. 36  Most cases invoking Section 7 protection
involve work actions that take place in the context of either a union-
organizing campaign or collective bargaining. At least since the Supreme
Court's 1962 decision in Washington Aluminum, however, the provision has
been construed to cover the concerted workplace protests of unrepresented
employees as well.37 Indeed, for a quarter century after Washington
Aluminum, Section 7 was virtually the only source of protection for non-
union protests because it was quite nearly the only exception to the
employment-at-will rule that otherwise governed American work law. 8
Today, however, there are multiple sources of protection for workplace
protests of various kinds. In employment discrimination law, Section
704(a) of Title VII prohibits employer retaliation against an employee for
opposition to unlawful discriminatory practices by the employer or
involvement in any legal challenge to those practices.39 Although the
provision itself dates back nearly to the time of Washington Aluminum,
retaliation claims increased dramatically during the 1990s and today
constitute over a quarter of the charges filed annually with the EEOC.40
Employment law has also become a prolific source of protection for
workplace protests. On the common law front, tort-based wrongful
discharge claims are often available for employees who are dismissed for
refusing to engage in unlawful conduct or for reporting such conduct to
public officials. Wrongful discharge protection for internal protests (for
reporting or objecting to unlawful conduct through channels inside the firm)
is less common,41 though there are some notable instances of successful
recovery in these circumstances as well.42
36. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
37. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (§ 7 protects employees of nonunion
employer who walked offjob to protest bitter-cold conditions in plant).
38. For an illuminating account of Washington Aluminum and its relationship to employment at will,
see Cynthia Estlund, The Story of NLRB v. Washington Aluminum: Labor Law as Employment Law in
EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester eds., 2007).
39. The text of § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees or applicants for employment ...because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.
40. EEOC, CHARGE STATISTICS, FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2006, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/
charges.html; see generally Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Retaliation Lawsuits: A Treacherous Slope, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1999 at C8 (quoting discrimination lawyer detailing increased filings and high win rates in
retaliation cases: "Retaliation resonates with the jury. They may not believe the employer terminated
someone because they are black, but they will believe they terminated someone because they rocked the
boat.").
41. See, e.g., Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 183-84 (1974) (finding no wrongful
discharge where employee voiced misgivings to superiors about adequacy of testing for a product,
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Whistleblower statutes covering private-sector employees are a second
source of employment law protection for workplace protests.43 In most
cases, the legislation in question protects the same types of conduct most
frequently protected by the courts-i.e., refusing to participate in unlawful
workplace activities and reporting such activities to law enforcement
officials-but many statutes also go where some courts have been reluctant
to travel and extend legal protection to employees who "oppose" unlawful
workplace conduct, which presumably covers employees who do so within
the firm."
Under contemporary law, then, there are sources of protection for
workplace protests available in discrimination law and employment law as
well as in labor law. But is this indeed another instance of doctrinal
integration, or is it simply a case of parallel protections available under laws
that cover quite separate and distinct kinds of employee conduct? To be
sure, there are important differences in emphasis and coverage among the
laws in question. For one thing, Section 7 of the NLRA protects only group
protests and mostly union protests at that, whereas the retaliation provisions
of Title VII and the various protections available to whistleblowers under
state law are commonly invoked by individuals. Moreover, Section 704(a)
of Title VII and the typical whistleblower protection statute focus primarily
on activities outside the firm- i.e., filing charges or otherwise reporting
employer misconduct to public officials- rather than protests that take
place within. Finally, each of these laws is designed primarily to protect
opposition to a particular kind of employer conduct, with Section 704(a) of
Title VII focused narrowly on unlawful workplace discrimination,
whistleblower law typically focusing more broadly on all unlawful
employer practices, and Section 7 of the NLRA reaching beyond the
unlawful to any issue that involves the "mutual aid or protection" of
working people.
There is nevertheless a great deal of overlap and interplay between and
among these disparate sources of law. In some cases, the overlap affords
aggrieved employees a choice among different legal theories. Thus, for
example, so long as they meet the requirement of "concert"-that is, of
participating in some form of group activity-employees who oppose
discriminatory employer conduct may be able to secure legal protection
under Section 7 of the NLRA, under Section 704(a) of Title VII, or under a
despite fact that employee's efforts eventually resulted in re-evaluation and withdrawal of product from
market).
42. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 480 (1980) (recognizing a
claim for wrongful discharge where employee was fired for internal efforts to ensure that employer's
products would meet standards established by labeling and licensing laws).
43. See INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS MANUAL 505:28-29 (BNA 1995) (identifying nineteen
states with private-sector whistleblower protection statutes).
44. See, e.g., Florida Whistleblowers Act, Fla. Stat. § 448.102(3) (1991).
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typical state whistleblower statute. And employees who report violations of
employment law to the appropriate public officials-e.g., safety claims to a
state workplace safety agency-may likewise enjoy protection under either
Section 7 or a state whistleblower statute.
In other cases, the overlap of sources results in a reduction rather than
an expansion of legal protection. For one example, claims that might
otherwise be available under the whistleblower provisions of Montana's
wrongful discharge statute are barred if they can be brought under any other
state or federal statute.4 5 For another, activities that might otherwise be
covered by Section 7 of the NLRA may lose their protection because of
employment discrimination and/or employment law policies.46 And for yet
another, activities that might otherwise enjoy coverage under Section 704(a)
of Title VII may lose their protection because of policies drawn from labor
law.47
More fundamentally, the apparent differences among these sources of
law loom larger on paper than they do in the context of live workplace
disputes. Oppositional activity may escalate quite seamlessly from voicing
a concern to a colleague or supervisor; to discussing the matter with a group
of similarly concerned colleagues; to seeking advice from unionized
employees at a nearby firm; to resisting a supervisor's directive; to asking a
local union for assistance; to calling or visiting law enforcement officials or
the press; to filing a formal legal claim against the employer and/or
attempting to organize a union.
As a result, the difference between union and non-union activities may
be overstated, particularly in view of the fact that contemporary unions are
increasingly pursuing organizing strategies that involve assisting individual
employees in bringing workplace claims regarding safety, health, overtime
pay, and similar concerns-a point to which we shall return in Part III. The
distinction between group and individual protests may likewise be
overstated since collective efforts more often than not begin with the
initiative of an individual, and individual efforts are with great frequency
supported in a variety of ways by the group.4 8
45. See Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, Mont. Code Anno., § 39-2-912(1)
(2005).
46. See, e.g., IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1292-93 (2004) (denying non-union employees the
right to the "mutual aid or protection" of a co-worker at a disciplinary investigation, citing, inter alia,
the need for unfettered and confidential investigations of actions that implicate employer obligations
under antidiscrimination and workplace safety laws).
47. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 71 n.25 (1975)
(suggesting that § 704 (a) protection might not extend to protest activities that undermine union's status
as exclusive representative of protesting employees). See generally Iglesias, supra note 10.
48. See Catherine R. Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions: Competing
Discourses and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39 LAW & SOC. REV. I1, 26-
28 (2005). See also Richard Michael Fischl, Fear and Loathing on the Shop Floor: Labor Law and
Social Dimension of Workplace Organizing (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Fischl, The Social
Dimension of Workplace Organizing].
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Against this backdrop, the availability of different sorts of claims to
vindicate particular protests is of great strategic importance to the
employees who mount them. Pursuing the case through the NLRB, for
example, is an attractive option for those with limited resources for legal
representation, since the agency will foot the bill if it agrees to take the
case. Tort actions and the handful of statutory actions in which punitive
damages are available provide another avenue for funding representation.
Whistleblower claims may well generate publicity that mere protests over
working conditions might not, and filing a Title VII retaliation claim might
be an effective way of buttressing a challenge to the discriminatory
practices in question.
When we don't see protest cases until they are already in play within a
particular legal regime, we risk the danger of ignoring the possibility that
employees and their representatives may have engaged in careful strategic
behavior either in characterizing the protest after the fact or in planning for
it in the first place-strategic behavior that is enabled by the considerable
doctrinal integration in the protections accorded workplace protests under
contemporary work law.
C. Employment at Will
In what is now an exceedingly familiar story, the final quarter of the
twentieth century brought dramatic changes to the employment-at-will
doctrine, the classic version of which enabled employers and employees
alike to part ways at any time "for good cause or for bad cause, or even for
no cause."49 The trend began in the mid-1970s, when a handful of state
courts began to conclude that there might, after all, be some reasons for
discharge-like refusing a date with your supervisor-that were "bad"
enough to warrant judicial intervention, and thus was born the modem law
of wrongful discharge.5"
The challenge to employment at will was evidently an idea whose time
had come, for state courts in the ensuing decade began condemning one
"bad" reason after another, sustaining wrongful discharge claims on a
variety of common law theories.51 The rule took a hit on a second front as
courts during the same period began to advance the equally novel
proposition that contract claims based on employer promises of job
security-implicit and explicit-ought to be enforceable under the same
rules that applied in other commercial settings.52 Within the space of a
49. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton
v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 544 (1915).
50. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
51. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 9.9-13 (3rd ed. 2005).
52. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980)
(enforcing contract claims based on language in personnel manual and oral representations by company
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decade, two new reporter systems emerged, publishing thick bi-weekly
packets of advance sheets and cataloguing the growing number of at-will
"exceptions" (as we revealingly described them) carved out by courts in the
vast majority of American jurisdictions.53
It is difficult to say whether and to what extent these developments
actually benefited employees. In the longer term, employers have not been
shy about looking for ways to avoid making job-security promises-as well
as ways to unmake promises already made-and the early enthusiasm for
ferreting out all manner of "bad" reasons began to founder on the shoals of
judicial second thoughts, restrictive legislative interventions, and the larger
wave of tort reform. Yet the period certainly produced an amazing amount
of workplace law, if not necessarily workplace justice, and lawyers and
academics alike tend to think of the resulting body of doctrine as the
centerpiece of contemporary individual employment law.54
As a growing body of scholarship contends, however, the most
important dimension of employment at will may lie less in what has
changed than in what has stayed the same, and what has stayed the same is
the rule's role as the "baseline" not only in common law decisionmaking
but also in the interpretation and application of statutes-specifically, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the NLRA.55 The statutes in
question each prohibit discrimination in hiring, firing, promotion,
compensation, and other terms and conditions of employment-Title VII
where the discrimination is based on race, gender, or some other protected
class, and the NLRA where discrimination is based on an employee's union
support or (as discussed in the previous section) her participation in
workplace protests.56 The lion's share of claims under each statute,
however, involve discharges, a phenomenon that is no doubt largely the
result of an understandable reluctance to sue one's current employer as well
as the fact that discharge typically occasions a multitude of harms that may
officials); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 101 (1977) (holding that discharge violated
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
53. See INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS CASE (BNA 1986-current); EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
REPORTER (1983-2000).
54. See, e.g., STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS chs. 4-8
(3rd ed. 2002).
55. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Symposium, The Changing Workplace: Wrongful Discharge
Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655 (1996); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil
Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443 (1996);
Fischl, Workplace Justice, supra note 16; Joseph E. Slater, The "American Rule" that Swallows the
Exceptions (Sept. 4, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-930143.
56. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006); National Labor Relations
Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of union activities);
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (extending NLRA § 7 protection to activities of
unrepresented employees).
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make litigation cost-effective and in any event a tempting avenue for
retribution.57
In American work law, all discharge cases are litigated in the shadow
of the employment-at-will rule, under which a dismissal is perfectly lawful
unless some particular exception to the rule is established. But the shadow
thus cast has a number of untoward consequences on the litigation of Title
VII and NLRA claims-consequences that are all but invisible when we
view discharge litigation through lenses that separate employment law (and
thus employment at will) from employment discrimination and labor law.
To summarize the aforementioned scholarly literature, the employment-at-
will rule has significant adverse effects on party strategy and attitudes, on
employer EEO practices, on the judicial treatment of wrongful discharge
claims, and on the availability of in-kind remedies. I will address each of
these points separately.
1. Effects on Party Strategy and Attitudes
Perhaps the most pronounced effect of employment at will on
employment discrimination litigation is a phenomenon I have previously
described as the "round hole/square peg" problem.58 Employees who have
discharge claims that are compelling as a matter of fairness, but which do
not meet the requirements of proof under discrimination law, frequently
attempt to squeeze their "square peg" of a case into the "round hole" of the
applicable legal category, lest the employment-at-will rule bring their action
to an abrupt halt. The challenge, of course, is getting past summary
judgment, for a jury is more likely to focus on the unfairness of the
discharge than on the match between legal theory and facts. Employers and
their lawyers are likely to be less charitable in their response to this strategy
and to view such efforts as dishonest at best, but the reality is far more
complex.
As a number of prominent progressive critics have argued, there is a
considerable gap between the lived experience of racism, sexism, and other
forms of subordination (an experience of confronting unreflective habits,
complex social structures, and entrenched institutional practices) and the
legal categories through which discrimination claims must be litigated
(which treat discrimination as the product of discrete and intentional acts by
errant individuals).5 9 Claimants who find themselves caught between the
57. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 985 n.3, 1031 (1991) (analyzing data revealing that
"plaintiffs in employment discrimination litigation rarely sue their current employers").
58. See Fischl, Workplace Justice, supra note 16, at 261.
59. See, e.g., id. at 261 n.25 (citing Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MtNN. L. REV. 1049
(1978); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
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rock of ill-fitting legal categories and the hard place of employment at will
thus have considerable incentives to recharacterize the subtle or the
unconscious as blatant and purposeful.6"
The results of this predicament are not pretty for anyone involved. As
I have argued elsewhere:
To state the matter bluntly, the need to repackage unjust dismissal claims as
discrimination claims needlessly racializes many employment disputes
while at the same time trivializing the real but subtle and complex role of
racial domination in the workplace. It leads employers and their lawyers to
conclude that minorities and their lawyers are dishonest-a perception that
is itself in large part the product of the same dominant cultural
understandings that construct the law's ill-suited "round hole" in the first
place. Thus, a charge of racial or gender discrimination is likely to be
viewed by the one so charged as an accusation of intentional racism or
sexism, and--especially in the rancorous context of the typical legal
dispute-efforts to explain that the problem is more complicated are less
likely to succeed in that endeavor than to convince the employer that the
charge is an exaggeration and the claimant acting in bad faith. The prospect
of such consequences would surely diminish were the employee to focus
instead on the unfairness of the dismissal, but that focus is obviously
precluded by employment-at-will.
These developments are obviously unlikely to promote a happy resolution
to the case at hand, nor are they likely to further the cause of employment
equity more generally. Indeed, as "square peg" claims proliferate, they
shape the attitudes of employers and personnel managers, of their lawyers,
and of the judges who hear these cases-judges who are, it is worth noting,
infinitely more likely to be recruited from the ranks of the management bar
than from the other side. The attitudes thus generated are likely to
influence, and not in a good way, the views of these repeat players toward
those in subordinated groups and toward employment equity issues in
general, and those are decidedly not the attitudes with which we would like
persons in positions of power over working people to operate.
61
2. Other Consequences ofLitigating Discharge Claims
in the Shadow of Employment at Will
Further consequences of the employment-at-will rule on the litigation
of unlawful discharge claims can be described with a bit more economy.
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161
(1995)).
60. See id. at 261-62.
61. Id. at 262-63.
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a. Effects on Employer EEO Practices
A legal regime that prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees, but-thanks in large measure to the employment-at-will rule-
does not otherwise require them to treat their employees fairly, creates
incentives for workplace practices that may ultimately undermine
antidiscrimination goals and fairness norms alike. As Cindy Estlund has
argued, employers may on the one hand attempt to minimize the prospect of
EEO challenges by discriminating against minorities at the entry level, and
yet at the same time "bend over backwards" in their treatment of minority
incumbents, thus simultaneously depriving the latter of honest feedback and
career-development incentives while generating resentment among their
non-minority colleagues at perceived double standards.6"
b. Effects on Judicial Treatment of Wrongful Discharge Claims
Many contemporary judges seem to view the employment-at-will rule
as granting employers a "license to be mean," in Ann McGuinley's apt
phrase63-a license, in other words, to do just what the rule says they can do
and fire employees for good reasons, if the occasion warrants, but otherwise
for bad reasons or even for no reason at all. Of course, the at-will notion far
more accurately captures teenage dating practices than it does anything
remotely resembling the decisionmaking of a typical employer. But as a
consequence of this judicial mindset, employees and their representatives
frequently face an uphill battle in persuading judges that an unjust dismissal
represents a significant departure from business norms and is therefore
likely the result of a forbidden motive (e.g., race or labor organizing), rather
than simply a privileged exercise in animosity, contrariness, or whimsy.'
The at-will mindset has had a second, subtler effect, as courts and
administrative agencies have developed the now familiar legal tests to guide
parties in their presentation of proof and fact finders in adjudicating the
claims, most notably the three-part McDonnell Douglas test for disparate
treatment claims under Title V1165 and the Wright Line burden-shifting test
for mixed-motive discharges under the NLRA.66 These tests rest on a series
of highly contestable assumptions that are themselves profoundly
62. See Estlund, supra note 55, at 1678-82.
63. See McGinley, supra note 55, at 1459-62.
64. See id.; see also Fischl, Workplace Justice,, supra note 16, at 263-65.
65. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973) (establishing that once
employee establishes primafacie case of discrimination, the employer must offer a legitimate reason for
the challenged decision, and plaintiff may prevail by establishing that the reason offered was a pretext
for discrimination).
66. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), upheld in NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S.
393 (1983) (holding that once the employee establishes that one of the reasons for the adverse action
was employer opposition to union activities, the employer must prove that it would have reached the
same decision even in the absence of the anti-union motive).
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influenced by the employment-at-will rule-i.e., the assumptions that
"employers" are individuals rather than institutions of various kinds (such
as bureaucracies, committees, and networks); that concepts such as "intent"
and "motive" can usefully capture the rich complex of considerations,
reactions, and prejudices that prompt us to do the things we do, let alone the
things we do collectively or institutionally rather than individually; and that
these subjectivities can be neatly and usefully divided into dichotomous
categories of "good" (or "legitimate" or "non-discriminatory") reasons and
"bad" reasons prohibited by law.67
Each of these assumptions is in large measure the product of a mode of
thinking that is organized by the dichotomous rule/exception relationship of
discrete legal prohibitions operating against the backdrop of employment-
at-will. And the structures of proof that those assumptions have spawned
misapprehend the dynamics of the employment relationship in much the
same way that they misapprehend the problems of racism and other forms
of subordination and in turn drive the "square peg/round hole" dynamic
described earlier.65
c. Effects on the Availability of In-kind Remedies
When an employee working in a unionized firm is wrongfully
discharged, the remedy available through grievance-arbitration is almost
invariably an award of in-kind relief-i.e., reinstatement to the position
from which she was unlawfully dismissed, together with any loss of pay
and benefits accrued during the period of dismissal. By contrast, in-kind
relief in the non-union setting, typically as a remedy for dismissal in
violation of Title VII or the NLRA, is notoriously ineffective; most non-
union employees are reluctant to return to their jobs for fear that their
employer will make them "pay at the office" for their success in the
courtroom, and the few who do return are likely to learn that those fears are
not unfounded.69
The principal difference between the two settings obviously lies in the
fact that an employee in a union firm enjoys the protection of an institution
well positioned to police the employer's post-reinstatement conduct and to
challenge acts of retribution, large and small. But there is a less obvious
factor in the ineffectiveness of reinstatement in the non-union setting, and
67. See Fischl, The Social Dimension of Workplace Protests, supra note 48 (describing difficulty
in distinguishing "insubordination" that is a legitimate basis for discharge from protected workplace
organizing activity under NLRA, on the basis of either the behavior itself or the employer's reaction to
it); McGinley, supra note 55, at 1466-73 (so-called "good" reasons may be unconscious reactions to
race, gender, or other protected status of claimant).
68. See Fischl, Workplace Justice, note 16, at 264-65.
69. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 86 (1990).
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once again it can be found in the background role of employment at will.
As I have argued elsewhere:
[T]he employee who is reinstated in the union setting will almost invariably
be the beneficiary of a provision in the underlying collective-bargaining
agreement that prohibits discharge or discipline in the absence of "just
cause." As a consequence, any subsequent mistreatment-from blatant
abuse at the hands of a supervisor embittered by the reversal of his
discharge decision; to subtler slights (like lukewarm evaluations); to
subconscious acts of petty retribution-will, if challenged, be evaluated on
the basis of substantive fairness and procedural regularity. Indeed, since the
employer is contractually obligated to ensure that all of its discharge and
disciplinary decisions conform to the "'just cause" standard-and typically
bears the burden of establishing that the standard has been satisfied in a
particular instance-it is likely to have policies and procedures in place that
will, to some extent, constrain the impulse for vengeance and, in any event,
establish a track record that will make deviant treatment stick out like a sore
thumb.
The contrast to reinstatement in the absence of a "just cause" guarantee
could scarcely be starker, for in that context the returning employee enters
hostile territory to confront an employer who is armed with the
employment-at-will rule. She will already be in a more precarious position
than the employee reinstated in the union setting, for she will have secured
her return through agency and/or court proceedings, thus visiting on the
employer a more protracted, more expensive, and more public reversal of
fortune than would have occurred in the arbitration context. But her ability
to challenge adverse action by the employer . . . will depend not on the
fairness or the regularity of the employer's conduct, but entirely on whether
a retaliatory motive can be established, . . . a mighty thin reed on which to
hang one's hopes for a successful return to a job from which one was
unlawfully dismissed.70
These effects of the employment-at-will rule--on party strategy and
attitudes, on employer EEO practices, on the judicial treatment of wrongful
discharge claims, and on the availability of in-kind relief-are far less
obvious and visible than the role of employment at will in the more familiar
setting of tort and contract claims in the employment law context, but they
loom large indeed in the day-to-day enforcement of Title VII, of the NLRA,
and indeed of the many other statutes that regulate discharge in the
contemporary workplace.
70. Fischl, Workplace Justice, supra note 16, at 267-68.
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D. Proof of Motive in Unlawful Discharge Cases
If what remains of the employment-at-will rule complicates employee
efforts to contest discharges under Title VII and the NLRA, the
proliferating exceptions to the rule present some daunting challenges for
American employers, who face a long and growing list of "bad" reasons for
which they are no longer free to fire at will. Indeed, the proliferating
exceptions may well appear to employers like a case of "water, water
everywhere," even if there is "'nary a drop to drink" from the perspective of
most discharged employees.
1. Evidentiary Overlap: Negotiating the Terrain of
Employment-at- Will's Proliferating Exceptions
We have already discussed the exceptions to the employment-at-will
rule established by employment discrimination law (the prohibitions against
discharge based on race, gender, and other forms of "status" discrimination,
as well as the protection afforded employees who "oppose" an employer's
discriminatory practices or bring legal challenges against them) and by
labor law (the prohibitions against discharge for participation in union as
well as concerted non-union activities).
We have also noted the protection that employment law affords
whistleblowing and various forms of workplace protest, but that is just the
tip of the iceberg in contemporary employment law. Additional at-will
exceptions are available under various federal statutes (protecting inter alia
the right to refuse a work assignment "because of a reasonable
apprehension of death or serious injury";7 to refuse to submit to a
polygraph examination;7" to take a leave of absence to attend to a family
member's illness;73 and to miss work in order to serve on a federal jury);74
under state statutes (protecting inter alia the right to file a workers'
compensation claim;75 to file a claim with the employer's group health
insurer;76 and to use tobacco products);" and even, in a handful of cases,
under state constitutional law (protecting the right to refuse to participate in
political activities).78 There are also important restrictions on discharge
arising from common law contract (which may support claims based on
71. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980) (interpreting § I l(c)(l) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2002)).
72. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2002).
73. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2654 (2002).
74. Jury System Improvements Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2002).
75. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (2006).
76. See, e.g., Health Insurance Claim Filing Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2 (2005).
77. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597 (2005).
78. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (Pennsylvania law);
Chavez v. Manville Prods. Corp., 777 P.2d 371 (N.M. 1989).
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job-security assurances 79 or on the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing)"° as well as tort law (which may support claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress;81 fraud;82 or intentional interference with
contractual relations).83
Negotiating the resulting terrain is no simple task, and perhaps the
greatest nightmare faced by management-side attorneys is that a client will
call for advice after discharging an employee rather than before. Among
other things, there is always the danger that the untutored client will reveal
to an unlawfully discharged employee or the latter's colleagues the truth
about the dismissal, thus considerably strengthening the employee's hand in
any ensuing dispute.84
But because of the interplay among the multitude of at-will exceptions
in contemporary work law, efforts to hide the truth--damning or not-can
be equally hazardous to an employer's attempts to avoid liability. Thus,
assigning a reason for the discharge that turns out to be false may enable the
discharged employee (a) to establish "pretext" in either a Title VII or an
NLRA discharge case and thereby raise an inference of discriminatory or
anti-union motive on the part of the employer;85 (b) to bring suit against the
employer for defamation based on the false statement;86 or (c) to provide
direct evidence of motive, if the employer unwittingly cites an unlawful
basis for discharge in an effort to explain away the adverse action. 7 Nor
can the problem be avoided by the simple expedient of not providing a
79. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985) (contract claim
based on language in personnel manual); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d
880 (Mich. 1980) (separate claims based respectively on personnel manual and oral representations).
80. See, e.g., Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 101 (1977).
81. See, e.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140 (1976).
82. See, e.g., Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. O'Neal, 224 Va. 343 (1982).
83. See, e.g., Cappiello v. Ragen Precision Indus., Inc., 192 N.J. Super. 523 (1984).
84. To be sure, contemporary employers have multiple sources of information about potential
discharge liability-including reports in the media and especially the business press, trade association
newsletters and programs, and human resource professionals who are far more focused on legal issues
than they were two decades ago-and studies suggest that employers are far more likely to overestimate
than underestimate the prospect of liability for discharge. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al.,
Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC. REv. 47
(1992). But there is an awful lot of law to know-much of it difficult for a lay person to understand
without a bit of work-and "avoiding legal problems" is only one of the concerns that animate the
actions taken by employers, albeit an important one. Moreover, lower-level managers and front-line
supervisors might well be oblivious to many such considerations, however well-tutored their principals
may be. So the occasions for unwitting admissions of unlawful conduct may well be more frequent than
those of us immersed in the legal dimensions of employment might expect, and for obvious reasons such
cases are not likely to show up as reported appellate decisions.
85. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (employer's reliance on
false reason for adverse action provides sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find unlawful
discrimination); NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1983) (employer's reliance on
false reason for adverse action supports NLRB's finding of anti-union motivation in discharge).
86. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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reason for the discharge-notwithstanding the lure of employment-at-will's
famous door number three ("no reason at all")-since that too may support
an inference of an illicit motive (what are you hiding?) and/or undermine
employer efforts to establish that a subsequently stated reason was in fact
the contemporaneous reason for the discharge (why didn't you say so in the
first place?).
We might describe this dimension of doctrinal integration as
"evidentiary overlap," where employer statements and actions have
potential evidentiary significance under more than one legal theory and
where the sources of liability as often as not lie in two or more of the
conventional work law fields. This is yet another reason why practitioners
must be conversant with legal doctrine in and across multiple subjects in
order to represent either party in a discharge case.
2. The Mixed-Motive Case
Wrongful discharge litigation has given rise to a second form of
doctrinal integration, this one in the case law dealing with the so-called
"mixed-motive" dismissal, where an employer is found to have lawful
reasons (e.g., absenteeism) as well as unlawful reasons (e.g., race, union
activities, whistleblowing) for the challenged discharge. The contemporary
rules governing the disposition of such cases in labor law and employment
discrimination, and increasingly in employment law as well, all find their
source in a single precedent, Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle.88
Mt. Healthy involved a claim by a teacher in a public high school that
the school board had refused to renew his contract in retaliation for
activities protected by the First Amendment. In support of that claim, the
teacher pointed to an employer admission-in the form of a written non-
renewal notice-that the refusal to renew was based on two of the teacher's
actions: making "obscene gestures" to students in the school cafeteria and
leaking to a local radio station an embarrassing official memo about an
upcoming bond issue.89
The Court assumed that the leak was constitutionally protected and that
the obscene gestures were not and thus faced the question of how to
determine the legality of an adverse action motivated by lawful as well as
unlawful considerations.9" (For economy of expression, I'll refer to the
adverse action as a "discharge" rather than a "refusal to renew the contract";
since the test applies in principle to any adverse action--discharge, refusal
to renew, layoff, demotion, cut in pay, etc.-this change should make no
difference to the analysis.) The Court resolved the matter in Solomonic
fashion, holding that a discharged employee could establish a constitutional
88. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
89. Id. at 282-83.
90. Id. at 284.
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violation upon a showing that retaliation against legally protected conduct
(here, the leaked memo) was a "motivating factor" in a discharge decision,
but that an employer might nevertheless escape liability with proof that it
would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the protected
conduct-i.e., on the basis of lawful reasons (here, the teacher's obscene
gestures) standing alone.9'
Mt. Healthy began its migration from constitutional law to
contemporary work law in the early 1980s, when the NLRB was in the
midst of a protracted battle with the First Circuit over the proper test for
analyzing anti-union discharge claims. In Wright Line, the agency sought
refuge in a higher authority and adopted the Mt. Healthy test for use in
NLRA cases.92 The First Circuit was not satisfied, but the authors of Mt.
Healthy defended their handiwork and upheld the agency's position in
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.93  The Mt. Healthy test-
known to NLRB lawyers as Wright Line and to the rest of us as
Transportation Management-remains to this day the law of retaliatory
discharges under the NLRA.
The test made its way into employment discrimination law in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,94 where the Court relied on both Mt. Healthy and
Transportation Management to resolve the mixed-motive problem under
Title VII.95 Congress had its say on the matter in the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which left the Mt. Healthy test intact but altered the effect of a
successful employer defense. Thus--consistent with Mt. Healthy--an
employee makes out her case by proving that discrimination was a
"motivating factor" in an adverse action, and an employer may defend by
proving it would have done the "same thing anyway." But a successful
defense does not defeat the statutory violation altogether and instead cuts
the remedy loaf in half, limiting an employee's recovery to attorney's fees,
costs, and declaratory relief, and excluding reinstatement, backpay, and
other individual remedies.96
91. Id. at 287.
92. See Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enfd on other grounds, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981).
93. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
94. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
95. Id. at 248-49.
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (statutory violation established where discrimination was
"motivating factor" in adverse employment action); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (authorizing
attomeys' fees, costs, declaratory relief, and some forms of injunctive relief upon violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A)-(B) (prohibiting specific relief and damages where
employer establishes that it would have taken the same action without the impermissible motivating
factor). See generally Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (discussing proof and remedies
in Title VII mixed-motive cases).
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In the meantime, lower court decisions have applied Price Waterhouse
to mixed-motive cases arising in other discrimination contexts,97 and state
courts have in turn relied on Price Waterhouse and Mt. Healthy in
addressing the mixed-motive problem in whistleblower and other
employment law contexts. 98
Viewed in retrospect, these developments suggest a certain
inevitability to the spread of Mt. Healthy, and it is easy to forget the active
role that lawyers played in arguing across the doctrinal borders in the first
place. As it happens, in the early 1980s I was one of the NLRB attorneys
who developed the agency's strategy in the Wright Line/Transportation
Management litigation. Labor law was then still very much an insular field,
and accordingly we were all surprised to find ourselves focusing as much as
we did on out-of-area law. Although I did not realize it at the time, it was
my first exposure to the doctrinal integration under examination here.99
E. Mandatory Individual Arbitration
Nowhere in contemporary work law is the phenomenon of doctrinal
integration more evident than in the case law governing the validity of pre-
dispute agreements requiring employees to submit statutory claims to
binding arbitration. The revolution here began with Gilmer and Circuit
City, a pair of Supreme Court decisions holding that such agreements are
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. 00 Responding to those
decisions, a rapidly growing number of American employers are insisting
that their employees enter them as a condition of hire or continued
employment. I"l  Although both Gilmer and Circuit City involved
97. See generally Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law
Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651, 665-66 (2000) (discussing use
of mixed-motive analysis in ADA context); Michael J. Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence: Individual
Disparate Treatment and the ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REV. 693 (2000) (discussing use of mixed-motive
analysis in ADEA context).
98. See, e.g., In re Montplaisir, 787 A.2d 178, 182 (N.H. 2001) (applying mixed-motive analysis
developed in Price Waterhouse to state whistleblower claim).
99. An account of our strategy and a critique of the body of doctrine that has grown out of
Transportation Management appears in Fischl, The Social Dimension of Workplace Organizing, supra
note 48.
100. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). Gilmer involved the standard form arbitration agreement used in the
brokerage industry to resolve disputes between brokers and firms regarding commissions and the like,
but the language on the form purported to cover "any dispute, claim, or controversy" arising between a
broker and his firm. See 500 U.S. at 21-22. The Court upheld the application of that agreement to an
age discrimination claim, but ducked the question of whether its decision applied to employment
contracts more generally. Id. at 25 n.2. Circuit City answered that question in the affirmative. See 532
U.S. at 124.
101. See KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 189 (2004) (reporting that, as of 2004, as many American employees were
covered by such agreements as were covered by union contracts).
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employment discrimination claims'° 2-as have the vast majority of the
many cases arising in their wake-this development has also had significant
consequences for labor law and employment law. But in a twist that ought
to remind employers everywhere to be careful what they wish for, an array
of employment law doctrines threaten to halt this development in its tracks.
1. What Gilmer Hath Wrought: Labor Law and Mandatory Arbitration
In the union workplace, mandatory arbitration has long been standard
practice for resolving most employee grievances. Indeed, the advantages of
grievance arbitration in protecting worker rights-including the expeditious
resolution of claims, experienced representation with costs spread across the
bargaining unit, and the prospect of prompt and effective in-kind relief-are
among the most significant benefits afforded employees by union
representation. Even so, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,1"3 a 1974
case that was one of the earliest to straddle the boundary between labor law
and what was then the newly developing field of employment
discrimination, the Supreme Court held that access to the judicial forum
was a critical feature of American civil rights law and accordingly that
employees in union firms were free to litigate rather than arbitrate their
discrimination claims.
There the matter quietly stood until the Gilmer decision in 1991, and in
the interim most academics and practitioners would have readily assumed
that if arbitration could not be forced on employees who enjoy all the
benefits of union representation then surely it could not be forced on a lone
employee working in a non-union shop. Indeed, in reaching the opposite
conclusion, the Gilmer Court was forced to devote no small amount of
ingenuity to explaining (albeit not in an entirely convincing way) how
Gardner-Denver might be distinguished."° Aficionados of the common
law method will no doubt be able to guess what happened next, for sure
enough more recent pronouncements on the topic have called the continuing
vitality of Gardner-Denver into question in light of Gilmer and its
burgeoning progeny."15
If Gardner-Denver is indeed ultimately laid to rest, some fairly
significant changes are likely to ensue in American collective bargaining.
102. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24 (claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Circuit
City, 532 U.S. at 110 (employment discrimination claims under state law).
103. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
104. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
105. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998) (declining to reach the
question whether Gilmer overruled Gardner-Denver but assuming for purposes of the decision that
union employees could be bound to arbitrate discrimination claims); Pryner v. Tractor Supply, 109 F.3d
354, 365 (7th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that Gilmer may have so distinguished Gardner-Denver as to
deprive it of any authoritative force but deciding to follow Gardner-Denver until the Supreme Court
says otherwise).
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For one thing, the sexual harassment claimants in union firms we were
discussing earlier 06 -not to mention union employees alleging any other
kind of discrimination claim-may for the first time be required to pursue
their claims through grievance arbitration.
But some challenging contract interpretation questions will have to be
resolved first, foremost among them whether a grievance arbitration
provision that never before covered discrimination claims has suddenly
expanded its scope without any action-let alone agreement-by the
parties. In a post-Gilmer decision treating Gardner-Denver more or less
like a dirty sock, the Supreme Court reasoned that the latter case "at least
stands for the proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum is of
sufficient importance to be protected against less-than-explicit union
waiver" and thus concluded that such waivers must be "clear and
unmistakable" to be effective, if indeed they are effective at all.'0 7 At least
one circuit has held that arbitration agreements that purport to cover "all
disputes" meet the "clear and unmistakable" test,0 8 never mind that for a
quarter century "all disputes" did not include discrimination disputes and
that the parties to a particular collective-bargaining agreement may
therefore have had no occasion to address the issue in the latest round of
bargaining.10 9
While this is mostly a transition problem, it will be an issue for nearly
every collective-bargaining agreement in the United States, since virtually
all of them contain grievance-arbitration provisions that purport to cover
"all disputes." ' 0 In the longer term, though, labor unions may be on the
verge of gaining an entitlement (i.e., the right to waive their members'
access to the judicial forum for discrimination claims) for which employers
may be willing to pay a bundle and-given the changing demographics of
union representation in the United States, a topic to which we shall return in
Part III-it may be an entitlement with which the rank-and-file are
increasingly comfortable parting.111
Gilmer and Circuit City have likewise stirred the pot on the question of
the effect of mandatory arbitration agreements on proceedings brought
before and by the EEOC and the NLRB. In Waffle House v. EEOC, the
106. See supra Part II.A.1.
107. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
108. Carson v. Giant Food, 175 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1999).
109. Cf Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. NLRB, 898 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1990) (despite
intervening change in the law, a no-strike agreement covering "any strike" does not constitute a "clear
and unmistakable" waiver of the right to engage in sympathy strikes absent evidence that the parties
agreed to such interpretation).
110. See BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS, supra note 14.
111. But see ALPA v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1999),judgment reinstated
on reh'g en banc, 211 F.3d 1312 (2000) (reading Gardner-Denver and Gilmer to permit employer to
circumvent union and bargain with individual employees over the submission of statutory claims to
arbitration).
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Supreme Court held that individual arbitration agreements cannot preclude
employees from bringing discrimination charges before the EEOC nor the
EEOC from going to court on those charges on behalf of that individual-
held, in other words, that the EEOC's law enforcement powers cannot be
diminished by an agreement to which it was not a party.'12 The NLRB's
aversion to individual arbitration agreements runs deeper still. Thus, in
Bentley's Luggage, the Board's General Counsel under President Clinton
found not only that such agreements could not and did not bind the NLRB
but also that requiring employees to sign such an agreement as a condition
of hire or continued employment was itself an unfair labor practice" 3-a
position recently reaffirmed by the Bush Board." 4
2. Pay back Time: Employment Law and Mandatory Arbitration
The arbitration agreements that contemporary employers are visiting
on their workers have imperial ambitions, once again typically committing
to the arbitral forum "all disputes." Indeed, that is precisely what got
employers into trouble with the EEOC in Waffle House and with the NLRB
in Bentley's Luggage. But quite apart from discrimination and labor law
claims, such agreements potentially cover a whole range of disputes
associated with employment law--disputes arising under contract (e.g., job
security claims based on the terms of an employee manual);" 5 tort (e.g.,
defamation claims based on employer statements made in connection with
discharge or discipline);" 6 and statute (e.g., whistleblower protection
claims)." 7 The application of arbitration agreements to the last of these-
specifically, to the context of whistleblower claims and particularly to those
that involve a refusal to violate the law or a communication with public
officials' -may be seen to implicate the law enforcement powers of an
individual state in much the same manner that Bentley's Luggage and
Waffle House raised the issue under federal law, and the validity of such
displacement is likely to be influenced by those decisions.
It is on a second front, however, that the employment law dimension of
this topic has already had an explosive effect on the developments initiated
by Gilmer. The central holding of that case is that the Federal Arbitration
Act puts arbitration agreements-including employment arbitration
112. Waffle House v. EEOC, 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
113. See NLRB, Advice Memorandum on Bentley's Luggage Corp., 12-CA-16658, (Aug. 21,
1995) available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/sharedfiles/admemo/admemo/i082195_bentley.asp.
114. U-Haul Co., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (June 8, 2006), slip op. at 3-4.
115. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
116. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.w.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
117. See, e.g., Florida Whistleblowers Act, FLA. STAT. § 448.101-105 (2005).
118. See id. at § 448.102(t)-(3) (protecting employees who report unlawful employer practices to
public officials, who cooperate in investigations of such practices conducted by public agencies, and
who refuse to participate in unlawful practices).
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agreements-"on the same footing" as other kinds of contracts and
accordingly that such agreements are enforceable under generally
applicable common law contract principles.119 In reaching that holding, the
Court may well have forgotten that the last time judges started applying
generally applicable common law contract principles to the employment
setting-in that case, to promises of job security that had been all but
unenforceable under the venerable employment-at-will rule-the result was
to generate enough litigation to spawn two new court reporter systems, a
three-credit law school course, and about a million CLE classes and law
review articles.120
It turns out that once again it ain't your grandfather's common law out
there, whether we are applying it to assurances of job security or to
arbitration agreements. Accordingly, an agreement (a) that is imposed on
employees under threat of discharge and/or refusal to hire; (b) that
prescribes terms on a non-negotiable, "take-it-or-leave-it" basis; (c) that
enables the employer but not the employee to revise the terms at will; (d)
that requires the employee but not the employer to arbitrate all claims
arising out of the employment relationship; (e) that requires the employee to
pay a hefty filing fee and/or a substantial portion of the arbitrator's fee; (f)
that is seldom read let alone fully understood by the employees who sign it;
and (g) that eliminates or sharply restricts rights and remedies that would be
available to the employee in litigation-in other words, the typical
contemporary pre-dispute arbitration agreement-may well be vulnerable
on grounds such as want of consideration, absence of mutual assent, breach
of the obligation of good faith, adhesion contract principles, and
unconscionability doctrine. As a result, scarcely a month has gone by in the
past few years without a new decision involving a challenge to the
enforceability of a particular employment arbitration agreement on state
common law grounds, and the challenges are succeeding in a surprising
percentage of the cases. 121
119. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,33 (1991).
120. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
121. Cases involving unconscionability challenges to the arbitration agreement forms used by the
beleaguered folks at Circuit City could alone fill a volume of Fed Third; see, e.g., AI-Safin v. Circuit
City Stores Inc., 394 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2005); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.
2003); Circuit City Stores Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Walker v. Ryan's
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005) (want of consideration); Hooters of Am., Inc. v.
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999) (breach of good faith). See generally Richard A. Bales,
Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415 (2006): Michael L.
DeMichele & Richard A. Bales, Unilateral-Modification Provisions in Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 63 (2006).
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In sum, Gilmer and Circuit City let loose a virus that has already
spread beyond employment discrimination law and appears poised to upend
three decades of law governing American collective bargaining. At the
same time, employment law principles are providing an increasingly
promising antidote, though whether it will kill the disease or the patient
remains to be seen. What is clear now, though, is that lawyers attempting to
understand these developments-let alone to predict where they are
headed-will need to be intimately familiar with the interplay of
developments emerging from all three conventional work law fields.
F. Employee Handbooks
As an astute work law practitioner has observed, "Ground zero in any
sexual harassment or discrimination case involving a large company will be
the no tolerance sexual harassment and/or discrimination policies located in
almost every employee handbook." '122 But he might have added that
handbooks are also "ground zero" for many labor law cases, since
handbooks today typically include a firm's solicitation, distribution, and
internet use policies, the facial validity and application of which are
frequently an issue in contemporary union organizing campaigns.'23
Likewise, handbooks are ordinarily full to the brim with policies governing
various employment law issues; indeed, there is even an exception to the
employment-at-will rule named in their honor, reflecting the fact that courts
in most states treat job-security assurances contained in personnel manuals
and similar documents as contractually binding against the employer.'24
When the so-called "employee handbook" exception to employment at
will took hold in the 1980s, many employers reacted by attempting to
rewrite their materials to opt back into the employment-at-will rule via
disclaimers of job security. And although state courts are virtually
unanimous in their willingness in principle to enforce such disclaimers
when clear and conspicuous, there is considerable controversy as to the
reach of that principle in particular contexts. Thus, for example, courts are
divided over whether to enforce disclaimers as midterm contractual
modifications against incumbent employees who have already been
122. John Douglas Winer, Use of Employee Handbooks/Personnel Manuals When Litigating
Sexual Harassment, Discrimination and Contract Claims, 650 PLI/LIT 175, 180 (2001).
123. See generally Nancy J. King, Labor Law for Managers of Non-Union Employees in
Traditional and Cyber Workplaces, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 827 (2003). In this connection, the NLRB has
recently ordered argument in a case raising a broad range of issues involving employer internet-use
policies under the NLRA. See Notice of Oral Argument and Invitation to File Briefs, The Guardian
Publishing Co., 36-CA-8743-1 (NLRB Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/foia/
documents/notice of argument.pdf.
124. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985); Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
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working under the protection of enforceable handbook promises,15 and over
whether to enforce disclaimers that conflict with competing sources of
contractual obligation, such as other statements in the handbook, oral
assurances by employer representatives, and longstanding employer
practices with respect to job security.'2 6
The making and unmaking of enforceable job-security promises is
conventionally understood as an employment law topic, but there are
related issues that cut across the boundaries of other work law subjects.
Foremost among these is the tension between employer efforts to render
their handbooks merely aspirational with respect to their own promises
(through disclaimers, careful wording, and the like) and at the same time to
use handbooks as the vehicle for imposing binding legal obligations on
employees. Thus, for example, employers who use the employee handbook
to announce a mandatory individual arbitration policy-a policy, as
discussed in the previous section, that typically purports to apply to "all"
work law claims-may find it difficult to enforce if they indicate
elsewhere in the handbook that its provisions are not "binding"'127 or are
subject to unilateral modification.'2
A similar double bind may arise for the many employers who use their
handbooks to announce the procedures for reporting and handling sexual
harassment claims within the firm. Current law offers great incentives for
establishing such procedures-and for bringing them to the attention of the
workforce-since by doing so an employer may limit legal liability for
subsequent instances of harassment.'29  The provisions in question
frequently include assurances that there will be no adverse consequences for
bringing-or offering evidence with respect to-a harassment claim, and
indeed without such assurances the employer's policies may lose their
prophylactic effect. 3 '
125. Compare Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 432 Mich. 438, 456-58 (1989) (upholding midterm
modification) with Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelhein Pharmacy, 234 Conn. 1, 13-17 (1995) (rejecting
modification).
126. Compare Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 437 Mich. 627, 650-51 (1991) (enforcing
disclaimer) with McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 110 N.M. 1 (1990) (effectiveness of disclaimer is a jury
question); McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990) (same); and Russell v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 952 P.2d 492 (Okla. 1997) (same).
127. See, e.g., Ex parte Beasley, 712 So. 2d 338 (Ala. 1998) (arbitration provision in employee
handbook unenforceable where handbook acknowledgment form stated that terms of handbook were not
legally binding).
128. See, e.g., Salazar v. Citadel Commc'ns Corp., 90 P.3d 466 (N.M. 2004) (arbitration agreement
in employee handbook was unenforceable because handbook provision retaining unilateral right to
modify handbook terms rendered employer's promise to arbitrate illusory).
129. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998) (establishing a two-prong
affirmative defense against hostile work environment claims based on supervisory conduct where
employer establishes such procedures and employee fails to use them, but holding that employer lost the
defense because, among other things, it "entirely failed to disseminate its policy" to the workforce).
130. See Elinor P. Schroeder, Handbooks, Disclaimers, and Harassment Policies: Another Look at
Clark County School District v. Breeden, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 581 (2004).
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How should the "mixed messages" be sorted out when such assurances
conflict with job-security disclaimers that appear with equal frequency in
contemporary employee handbooks? Does a broad disclaimer apply to
assurances against retaliation for bringing or providing evidence in
connection with sexual harassment claims? If so, does that undermine the
employer's claim that it maintains an effective policy against sexual
harassment? If the assurances are enforceable, however-because
ambiguity ought to be construed against the drafter and/or resolved in a
manner that furthers national antidiscrimination policy-what is left of the
disclaimer?
The case law on the effectiveness of disclaimers that are in tension
with other handbook provisions is, as previously noted, in a state of
disarray, with some courts enforcing disclaimers in spite of such
ambiguities and others leaving the question of enforcement to the jury.131
But where those "other handbook provisions" are policies that govern
sexual harassment, the resolution of the conflict obviously implicates both
employment law and discrimination law principles,132 offering yet another
example of an important topic in contemporary work law that straddles the
conventional disciplinary boundaries.
III.
LOOK, MA, NO BORDERS (CONT'D):
THE FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION OF AMERICAN WORK LAW
It's not just legal doctrine that's operating across the conventional
subject-matter boundaries these days. The functions conventionally
associated with the individual subjects themselves are increasingly
traversing those boundaries as well. We will explore that phenomenon
in this part of the Article, and I will offer some observations about the ways
in which many of the instances of doctrinal integration we examined in
Part It are symptoms of the functional integration we are looking at here.
Perhaps the most important illustration of functional integration is what
might be described as the "cross-migration" of employment discrimination
law and labor law, as the institutions historically associated with each-
discrimination litigation and labor unions, respectively-have increasingly
assumed the roles traditionally performed by the other. Specifically, the
workplace dispute resolution functions once performed for a substantial
portion of the American workforce by labor unions and collective
bargaining have in large measure been displaced by a system in which
discrimination litigation-and efforts by employers to avoid it-
predominates. At the same time, the role of restructuring the American
131. See cases cited supra note 126.
132. See Schroeder, supra note 130, at 588-89.
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workplace in the name of equality and antisubordination principles, a role
historically associated with discrimination law, is increasingly played today
by labor unions that are energetically organizing and championing women,
people of color, immigrants, and the working poor. And in each case,
employment law is playing a critical subsidiary role in this transformative
cross-migration.
A. Workplace Dispute Resolution
1. From Collective Bargaining to Discrimination Law
In the post-World War II era, labor unions represented nearly 40% of
the private-sector workforce, and collective bargaining provided the
dominant model of dispute resolution in the American workplace.
Challenges to employer decisions regarding pay, promotions, seniority, and
a host of other issues were governed by the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement negotiated between the employer and the union representing its
employees, and such challenges were almost invariably resolved through an
internal grievance-arbitration process that was likewise a creature of the
parties' contract. Historically as well as today, the overwhelming majority
of collective agreements have contained a provision prohibiting discharge
or discipline in the absence of "just cause," and a majority of the labor-
management disputes that eventuate in arbitration involve "just cause"
challenges to discharge or disciplinary actions against individual
employees.'33
As union density in the United States declined precipitously between
the 1970s and the 1990s, another body of law emerged that has, in effect,
assumed for non-union employees the dispute-resolution role played by
collective bargaining-and in particular by "just cause" grievance
arbitration-in an earlier era. The centerpiece of the contemporary
approach is employment discrimination law, and its effect on dispute
resolution in the American workplace is largely the result of a confluence of
developments that occurred during the same period as the union decline.
Thus, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed "spectacula[r]" growth in the
number of employment discrimination claims filed in federal court'34 as
well as a marked shift from class actions, which had dominated the docket
during the early years under Title VII, to individual cases alleging disparate
treatment.'35 The latter shift was partly the result of a one-two punch from
133. See LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE: A COURSEBOOK 249, 258 (2000)
(reporting that 92% of collective-bargaining agreements contain a "just cause" provision and that in a
recent sample year 56% of all labor arbitrations involved discharge or discipline disputes).
134. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 57, at 985 (reporting a 2166% increase in employment
discrimination filings during that period).
135. See id at 1019 (reporting a 96% decline in discrimination class actions between the mid-1970s
and the end of the 1980s).
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the Supreme Court via decisions that made disparate impact claims more
difficult to mount136 and that sharply limited the availability of class actions
in employment discrimination cases, 137 but it was every bit as much the
result of a steep numerical increase in the filing of individual suits.
131
At the same time, the target of discrimination suits shifted
dramatically-from hiring discrimination, which had been the principal
target of most class action litigation, to the discriminatory discharge, the
principal target of the lion's share of individual suits.'39 Likewise, the
nature of the discrimination challenged by these proliferating individual
actions revealed a sharp shift from what was originally a nigh exclusive
focus on race discrimination toward actions alleging age discrimination and
reverse discrimination.14 ° With the Supreme Court's imprimatur in 1986,
sexual harassment claims exploded as well,'41 and, as the 19 90s began,
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 began to add to
the mix.
These trends were further accelerated by the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII by providing the right to a
jury trial and the prospect of punitive damages in individual discrimination
actions, thus making such claims far more attractive to the plaintiffs' bar.'42
In the half decade following the enactment of that statute, employment
discrimination filings in the federal courts doubled, with the largest
increases registered in sex and disability claims, offsetting a decrease in
racial claims.'43 Indeed, by the current decade, fully 40% of the EEOC's
136. Ward's Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
137. E. Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147 (1982).
138. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 57. The blow to disparate impact was partially
remedied by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, but the disparate impact case has never
recovered from the Ward's Cove death blow. See id. at 998 n.57.
139. See id. at 1015 (reporting that hiring challenges outstripped discharge challenges by a ratio of
2:1 in the mid-60s, but discharge challenges outstripped hiring challenges 6:1 two decades later).
140. See id. at 989 (Table 2) (finding that age discrimination cases accounted for over 11% of the
increase in discrimination filings between 1970 and 1989 and that reverse discrimination claims were
part of a cohort that accounted for nearly 10% of the total increase).
141. In 1985, nine sexual harassment claims were filed with the EEOC. In 1986, the year the Court
decided Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, the number rose to 624; to over 1600 in 1987;
and to approximately 2000 in 1988, where it remained for the following three years. See EEOC,
TRENDS IN HARASSMENT CHARGES FILED WITH THE EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harassment.html.
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 198 la-(a), (b) (punitive damages); § 198 la-(c) (jury trials).
143. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination
Law in the 1990s: A Preliminary Empirical Investigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 261-62, 272 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L.
Nelson eds., 2005). On the sexual harassment front, in 1992-the year following passage of the new
Civil Rights Act as well as the confirmation hearings for Justice Clarence Thomas-the number of
sexual harassment filings rose to nearly 3000, an increase of 50% over the prior year. Filings rose
further to approximately 3500 in 1993 and to between 4000 and 6000 claims in every year since. See
TRENDS IN HARASSMENT CHARGES FILED WITH THE EEOC, supra note 142.
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caseload consisted of age and disability discrimination claims and thirty
percent were sex discrimination claims. '"
Thus, by the late 1990s, individual challenges to employer discharge
decisions were being litigated in quite literally thousands of discrimination
suits before American courts. The nature of the discrimination under
challenge-a declining number based on race and a greatly increased share
of sex, age, disability, and reverse discrimination claims--confirms a great
deal of anecdotal evidence that the plaintiff cohort has been increasingly
populated by white folks and not a few white men. Now I do not contend
that these discrimination suits were in any sense a "simple substitute" for
grievance arbitration under a union contract, for there are many discharge
claims that would be likely to succeed under a "just cause" standard but
which discrimination law would not reach-e.g., a case involving a
personal grudge by a supervisor or a punishment too harsh for the
misconduct at issue. Moreover, although a substantial share of labor
arbitrations involve discharge claims, there are also many cases where
discipline falls short of discharge, as well as many cases dealing with pay,
promotion, and other terms of employment.'45 Individual discrimination
suits, by contrast, focus overwhelmingly on discharge-and those that do
not will typically focus on hiring discrimination-a difference no doubt
born of the fact that it is a lot scarier for an incumbent employee (as
opposed to a prospective or former employee) to sue her employer than to
bring a grievance against it. 146
But these points of difference should not be overstated. For one thing,
one of the fundamental precepts of "just cause" is a commitment to treating
like cases alike, which is why "past practice" has always played such a
prominent role in labor arbitration. And by the time you finish counting all
of the bases on which contemporary discrimination law prohibits employers
from "distinguishing" other discharge cases-race, color, gender,
pregnancy, national origin, religion, age, and disability under federal law
alone-you have obviously covered an awful lot of "just cause" ground.
Furthermore, there is the "square peg/round hole" phenomenon I described
earlier-i.e., the not infrequent occasions on which discharged workers who
do not enjoy the protection of a "just cause" provision are forced by current
law to recharacterize an "unjust" discharge as a "discriminatory" one if they
want their claim heard. 147 So the overlap between potential "just cause"
144. EEOC, CHARGE STATISTICS, FY 1992 THROUGH FY 2005, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/
charges.html.
145. See COOPER ET AL., supra note 133, at 249 (reporting that in a recent sample year 56% of
labor arbitrations involved discharge or discipline disputes, 19% involved wages and hours, 10%
seniority, and 3% fringe benefits).
146. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 57, at 985 n.3, 1031.
147. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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cases and actual discrimination filings may be far greater than first
supposed.
Indeed, the fact that these individual discrimination suits were
proliferating just as union membership in the United States was steeply
declining is surely no coincidence.' 48 But my argument here is not about
causation but about the development of a marked functional shift whatever
its causes-i.e., the displacement of collective bargaining by discrimination
litigation as the dominant model of dispute resolution in the American
workplace, a displacement that is the "backstory" to many of the
illustrations of doctrinal integration we witnessed in Part II.
2. The Relationship Between Functional and Doctrinal Integration
a. Discrimination Law and Employment at Will
In a world of work in which discharge is governed by "just cause" (i.e.,
under the typical collective-bargaining agreement), the employment-at-will
rule is entirely displaced and thus quite nearly without consequence for a
worker challenging discipline or dismissal. But in a world of work in
which antidiscrimination law governs and "just cause" protection has
largely vanished (i.e., the world most employees live in now), the role of
employment at will assumes critical importance. Indeed, as we saw in Part
II, the interplay between discrimination law and at-will doctrine is a
principal source of multiple pathologies in the contemporary practice of
American work law, fostering unsalutary effects on litigation strategy (the
"square peg/round hole" problem), on employer EEO practices, on judicial
understandings of the stakes in discharge cases, and on the availability of
reinstatement as an effective remedy for wrongfully discharged
employees.'49
b. The Role of Employment Law Claims in Discrimination Litigation
In Part II, we also saw the increasing use of employment law and
particularly tort theories (e.g., intentional infliction of emotional distress
and defamation) in a variety of discrimination contexts: as the basis for
pendent claims in Title VII actions; as independent vehicles for such claims
where a Title VII action is precluded (e.g., by the statute of limitations or
employer size) or where punitive damages are unavailable or subject to low
caps under Title VII; and as a complicating factor in a number of settings
and particularly in sexual harassment cases, where alleged perpetrators may
deploy them to fend off employer-imposed discipline.
148. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 57, at 1019 (observing that decline in unionization
"undoubtedly" contributed to the increase in discrimination filings).
149. See supra Part II.C.
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The last of these developments-recourse to the common law among
alleged perpetrators of sexual harassment-is of course yet another product
of the fact that we are living in an "at-will" rather than "just cause" world.
Employees disciplined or discharged for alleged sexual harassment are in
no position to protect their jobs-by challenging the accuracy of the
charges against them; the fairness of the procedures employed; and/or the
proportionality of the punishment received-except through deployment of
such theories.
As for the rise of tort claims as pendent and independent vehicles in
pursuing discrimination challenges, here too the rise of workplace dispute
resolution via employment discrimination litigation-and the corresponding
eclipse of the collective-bargaining model-provides a robust account. The
key lies in the difference between both remedies and representation under
the respective models. In a nutshell, we have replaced a dispute resolution
system in which the injuries of discharge are almost invariably remedied via
in-kind relief and in which the costs of representation are spread throughout
the workforce with a system in which money damages secured through
litigation must be large enough to cover both victim compensation and the
cost of representation. An unrelenting quest for damages-enhancing claims
has thus become a central feature of the latter system.
Under collective bargaining, representation by union staff in grievance-
arbitration is one of the benefits of union membership, and the costs of that
benefit are spread throughout the bargaining unit via union dues and fees.
There are upsides and downsides to this form of representation. On the one
hand, the grievant typically has the benefit of representation by a repeat-
player thoroughly familiar with the employer's shop floor practices and
with past arbitral decisions-once again, vital factors in "just cause"
cases-not to mention a representative who can bring pressure to bear on a
reluctant employer that extends far beyond the grievance at hand. On the
other hand, the "cause of action" belongs to the union rather than to the
individual employee, for the question whether to press the grievance at
all-and, if so, how to pursue it (on what theory, with what evidence,
etc.)-is up to the union, not the individual grievant.15 °
150. In the ordinary course, this is a problem mostly for employees with marginal claims, but the
representational structure can present a serious problem for the odd man out, particularly when the odd
man out is a woman working in a traditionally male workplace or a member of a subordinated racial
minority. This dimension of the predicament was in no small measure the animating concern behind the
Supreme Court's decision in Gardner-Denver, enabling union-represented employees to end-run the
grievance arbitration process and pursue their discrimination claims in court. It also accounts for the
development of "duty of fair representation" law, which offers employees recourse against the union
when the latter refuses to process or otherwise mishandles a grievance on account of the grievant's race
or some other discriminatory basis. Gardner-Denver and the duty of fair representation are thus
arguably early instances of doctrinal integration, since each represents a mix of labor law and
employment discrimination law. More plausibly, I think, the two doctrines can be viewed as an
important part of the dynamic that maintained distinct and separate categories for those two work law
subjects, for each had the effect of segregating discrimination issues from the main body of labor law.
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Whatever its virtues and vices, though, collective representation means
that the individual grievance need not be self-funding. By contrast,
representation in discrimination litigation is almost invariably provided by a
private attorney, whose services are typically secured through a large
retainer ($10,000 to $15,000 in most locales) and the promise of a
substantial contingency fee (33% or even 40% of the damage award). 5'
There are obviously virtues and vices here as well. Representation is
beholden only to the client's interests, yet it may not be available at all to
employees who lack substantial financial resources as well as a claim that
will justify high damages. But my point is a structural one: In contrast to
the cost-spreading device of collective bargaining, representation in dispute
resolution via litigation must as a practical matter be funded by the
proceeds from--or the prospect of proceeds from-that litigation.
On the remedies side, the singular feature of grievance arbitration in
collective bargaining is the availability and effectiveness of in-kind relief.
In the typical case, the remedy for a wrongful discharge is reinstatement,
and, apart from backpay for any losses accrued during the pendency of the
grievance (typically a period of weeks or a couple of months at the most),
money damages are not required to make the employee whole for the
various losses that typically attend dismissal in the non-union setting (e.g.,
reputational, resume, and career-development effects; emotional con-
sequences; losses due to absence of income; etc.).
By contrast, for a host of reasons in-kind relief is all but out of the
question in discrimination litigation. First and perhaps foremost, you
cannot live very long on a third of a reinstatement order, so plaintiffs'
lawyers operating on a contingency basis-which is to say virtually all of
them-do not have much incentive to figure out how that device might be
made to work, and a reinstated employee faces the unhappy prospect of
returning to work as an "at will" employee with neither "just cause"
protection nor a union around to police it.'52 Moreover, the incentives
present in collective bargaining for both sides to negotiate an expeditious
and amicable resolution of a claim because of their stakes in the larger,
ongoing relationship are all but absent in discrimination litigation. Indeed,
with one representative paid a percentage of the money damages award and
the other typically paid by the hour to oppose her, there is very little
structural incentive to lower the costs of dispute resolution.
As a result, then, money damages are as a practical matter the only
game in town, and if both the attorney and claimant are to be compensated
enough to make pursuit of the claim worthwhile, then they will have to be
relatively high. Thus, then, is another of our instances of doctrinal
151. See generally Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary
Guidelines and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1992).
152. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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integration accounted for: The search for damage-enhancing legal theories
is in large measure an artifact of the need to fund representation and to
compensate for losses where "free" representation and in-kind relief are as a
practical matter simply unavailable.
C. The Employee Handbook and the "Legalist" Revolution in Human
Resource Management
The account I have given thus far of the increasing role of employment
discrimination litigation in workplace dispute resolution has been missing a
critical dimension, for American employers did not sit idly by as these
developments took place. Indeed, the reaction among American employers
was as dramatic as the trends to which they were responding, as many
undertook aggressive discrimination law compliance programs in the late
1980s and the 1990s. A "legalist" approach began to encroach on
traditional managerial/motivational values in human resource (HR)
practices more generally, partly as a result of a substantial increase in
reliance on legal professionals for guidance in employee relations matters
and partly as a result of an increasing focus on the legal constraints on
employer decisionmaking by HR professionals themselves.'53
Nowhere was this reaction more evident than in personnel manuals and
employee handbooks, which were recrafted in the name of discrimination
law compliance and as a result quickly became-in the apt expression
quoted earlier-"ground zero" for discrimination and sexual harassment
policies and claims.'54 This trend was no doubt reinforced by the unwitting
role HR professionals played in a second massive rewriting of employee
manuals that occurred during the same period-this one the result of the
fact that state courts in the early 1980s had suddenly begun enforcing all of
those assurances of job security and procedural justice that had for many
years been included in employee handbooks at the HR professionals'
insistence. In their original effort they had presumably been guided by a
desire to mimic the perceived benefits of union employment and thus to
reduce the prospect of a pesky union campaign. But imagine everyone's
surprise when it turned out that employers had to actually do what the
handbooks said they would do or else begin promising a rather different
kind of employment relationship in the documents they circulated to
employees.
The former course evidently did not occur to many American
employers, for the road almost invariably taken was a massive
"unpromising," as virtually every HR conference-and not a few
conferences for employment lawyers-in the mid- and late-1980s focused
like a laser beam on how to rewrite all those manuals and handbooks in
153. See generally Edelman et al., supra note 84.
154. Winer, supra note 122, at 180.
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order to render them promise-free or at least free of any promises that
courts were likely to enforce. Thus had legal concerns triumphed over the
traditional mix of managerial/motivational values, as HR professionals were
either downsized or deputized-replaced by the folks in the General
Counsel's office or enlisted to assist them in the legal colonization of
workplace governance. 155
The net result-manuals with all sorts of strong statements and
seemingly serious policies about discrimination and sexual harassment,
accompanied somewhat confusingly by scary bold-print legalese designed
to convince employees that nothing in the manual created any legally
binding promises at all-bore a not altogether coincidental resemblance to
the emerging regulatory regime and all of its internal tension: i.e.,
discrimination law operating in the looming shadow of employment at will.
And since the product of this mad flurry of revision plays a central role in
multiple areas of work law-handbooks are a central feature in litigation
over employee contract claims, over employer defenses in discrimination
and particularly sexual harassment cases, and, increasingly, over the
validity of mandatory individual arbitration procedures-it is no surprise
that this tension reflects itself in the doctrinal integration we explored in
Part 11.156
d Mandatory Individual Arbitration
The considerable costs-financial, time, and otherwise-of the shift
from dispute resolution via collective bargaining to employment
discrimination litigation have fallen on employers as well as on employees,
155. A project that will have to await another day is a study of the ways in which American HR
professionals have displayed an uncanny knack for remaining one step behind the antics of their
corporate colleagues and pretty much clueless about the law. Thus, in the 1970s, they were busy
drafting personnel manuals with promises ofjob security that their principals would often violate willy-
nilly, see, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985) (rejecting employer's
contention that Simon didn't say the firm would actually keep its job security promises). In the mid-
1980s, they were busy rewriting those manuals-no doubt with a bit of help from General Counsel-to
remove those promises of job security even as their principals were busy sending a different set of
messages altogether to the rank-and-file, see supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. In the late-
1980s, they were busily inflating the threat of common law wrongful discharge actions to their firms at a
point in time when the threat, never great to begin with, was actually beginning to abate, see Edelman et
al., supra note 84. In the 1990s, and again with the help of General Counsel, they were busy drafting
sexual harassment policies that were long on abolishing "sex," short on regulating "harassment," and in
any event once again inflating the actual legal requirements, see Schultz, supra note 19. And then, in
the early part of the current decade, they were promoting a whole new set of promises-this time about
the firm's commitment to career mobility and professional development-even as the General Counsel's
office was doing its level best to thwart mobility by drafting non-compete and trade secret protection
agreements, requiring entry-level and incumbent employees to sign them, and attempting to enforce
them in the courts, see STONE, supra note 101. For a nuanced view of some of the competing
professional constraints in play here, see Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The
Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & Soc. REv. 497 (1993) (describing effect of
managerial values of HR professionals on processing of civil rights disputes at the end of the 1980s).
156. See supra Part II.F.
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so it is no surprise that the former have developed a number of strategies
designed to reduce those costs. (The most effective cost-reduction strategy
for employees is, of course, union representation in dispute resolution, but
that's an alternative that is not widely available to employees at non-union
firms.)
Some of the employer strategies focus on the "supply side" of legal
services, as management has increasingly moved litigation work in-house
and has also taken advantage of a market for legal services that is
considerably more competitive now than it was two decades ago. But the
principal employer cost-cutting strategy has been on the "demand side"-
i.e., taking the "law" out of dispute resolution by requiring employees to
move their employment claims in-house too and thus to arbitrate rather than
litigate them. As we saw in Part II of this Article, litigation challenging the
validity of that practice has resulted in perhaps the most dramatic instance
of doctrinal integration in American work law, spawning a body of doctrine
that is governed on the one hand by the tension between labor law (the
Supreme Court's Gardner-Denver decision prohibiting unions and
employers from requiring employees to take their discrimination claims to
grievance arbitration) and employment discrimination law (the Court's
Gilmer decision permitting employers to require unrepresented employees
to arbitrate such claims) and is governed on the other hand by the tension
between employment discrimination law (Gilmer's holding that
employment arbitration contracts ought to be enforced just like any other
kind of commercial contract) and employment law (the common rules that
actually govern the enforcement of employment contracts outside the
mandatory arbitration setting).157
The resulting integration of doctrine governing the validity of
mandatory individual arbitration is yet one more consequence of the
displacement of collective bargaining by employment discrimination
litigation as the principal model for contemporary workplace dispute
resolution. As employers have moved to cut costs-and, perhaps, also the
risk of loss-by attempting to "contract out" of the court system and into
mechanisms of their own making, the courts have responded by adding new
layers of regulation in the name of contractual fairness.
B. The Pursuit of Workplace Equality: From Discrimination Law to
Union Representation
If the big story in American work law in the waning years of the last
century was the displacement of collective bargaining by employment
discrimination litigation as the principal vehicle for dispute resolution in the
American workplace, the big story in the current decade is the increasing
157. See supra Part I.E.
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role of labor unions in a struggle for workplace equality that was at one
time the nigh exclusive province of discrimination law.
1. Organizing Low- Wage Workers
During the past decade and a half, the American labor movement has
attempted through a variety of strategies to reverse the decline in union
membership described in the previous section. By some distance its most
dramatic and promising gains have occurred through organizing efforts in
low-wage industries such as custodial and landscaping work; health care
(including non-professional hospital work, elder care, child care, and home
health care); secretarial, clerical, and other support work in higher
education; industrial laundry work; poultry and meat processing; and
hospitality and tourism. These industries have three features in common,
each of them presenting the labor movement with an opportunity for
success in a world of work that has otherwise become more intensely
hostile to unions-and to union organizing-than in any period in U.S.
history since the 1930s.
First and foremost, work in these industries cannot, as a practical
matter, be "exported," and accordingly the ability of American employers to
use-and, perhaps more to the point, to threaten to use-their most
effective anti-union tool is virtually eliminated.
Second, many of the jobs in these low-wage industries are performed
by workers employed by independent contractors rather than directly by the
firms for whom the work in question is done. In an ironic twist, this
contracting structure-originally developed in the 1970s and 1980s by
American employers trying to reduce labor costs and to avoid or eliminate
unions-has afforded contemporary unions an opportunity to undertake
industry-wide organizing drives of the sort not seen since the 1930s and
enabled it to bring secondary pressures to bear on both contractors and user
firms that would be far more difficult to deploy in more traditional union
campaigns. "'
The third and final feature that makes these industries a promising
target for labor organizing-and the feature that is the source of the instance
of functional integration under examination here-is that the workforces in
question are heavily female and largely comprised of people of color and
recent immigrants. These populations are typically in a poor position to
better their economic lot through individual labor market strategies because
of structural impediments such as racial and/or language discrimination,
educational and skills training disadvantages, and (particularly in the case
158. See, e.g., David Moberg, Hung Out to Dry. Unions Fight Back Against Antilabor Laundry
Giant Cintas, IN THESE TIMES, Sept. 1, 2003 (describing union organizing workers of large industrial
laundry firm that provides linen service for the Starbucks coffee chain mobilized a rally outside
Starbucks outlet in tony urban setting to pressure laundry firm into ceasing antiunion activities).
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of women in these demographics) the competing responsibilities of care
work. Legal strategies are likewise typically foreclosed for this population,
given the decline of the employee class action and disparate impact theory,
and the prospect of individual disparate treatment litigation-a chimera at
best for most American workers-isn't even on the screen for a
demographic heavily populated by individuals with neither the funds to
front a retainer nor the salary to offer the possibility of a substantial
backpay award.
Among these groups, then, collective economic action is as a practical
matter the only recourse, and it is accordingly no coincidence that
organizing efforts among them have in substance and strategy resembled
civil rights drives as much as they have traditional union campaigns. From
the "one-on-one" recruiting strategy that drew heavily on insights drawn
from feminist theory in the successful campaign among the predominantly
female support staff at Harvard'59 to the "identity-based" organizing tactics
among Latin immigrant communities in the famous L.A. Justice for Janitors
campaign, 60 a focus on the needs, interests, and cultures of these
subordinated groups-and in particular on the prospect of enabling them to
achieve a measure of dignity and equality in the workplace-has
characterized the efforts of the labor movement to rally them to labor's
cause.16"' Thus has contemporary union organizing and representation come
to be known as "the new civil rights movement," assuming for a large and
growing segment of the American labor market the role originally
envisioned for employment discrimination law.
2. The Strategic Deployment of Law
In a second and related development, labor unions are using traditional
labor law-as well as discrimination and employment law-in novel ways
to achieve their organizing and representational ends. To be sure, the most
widely publicized element of contemporary organizing is a law-avoidance
strategy, for the most active unions on the organizing front are steering
clear of the NLRB's traditional representation procedures-i.e., an agency-
conducted secret-ballot election and post-election appeals for resolving
election disputes-having concluded on the basis of years of experience
that those procedures are terribly slow and virtually ineffective against the
159. See JOHN HOERR, WE CAN'T EAT PRESTIGE: THE WOMEN WHO ORGANIZED HARVARD
(1997).
160. See Maria L. Ontiveros, A New Course for Labour Unions: Identity-Based Organizing as a
Response to Globalization, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE
PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 417 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002).
161. See generally ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY
CALIFORNIA (Ruth Milkman ed., 2000); ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES
(Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998).
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unlawful employer resistance that is typically encountered in a union
campaign, both historically and today.
16 2
Contemporary unions are instead engaging in a variety of "self-help"
strategies designed to secure employer recognition without direct
governmental intervention. The most familiar elements of such efforts
include the so-called "corporate campaign" (in which the organizers
orchestrate an escalating barrage of publicity, appeals to the public, and
protest activities aimed at firms and prominent individuals doing business
with the target employer); the "neutrality agreement" (whereby the
employer agrees not to oppose the organizing campaign); and the "card-
check recognition agreement" (whereby the employer agrees to recognize
and bargain with the union upon presentation of authorization cards or
petitions signed by a majority of employees and authenticated by a mutually
agreed upon third party).
These tactics are much in the news163 and have generated no little
controversy among labor law scholars, union and employer organizations,
and members of Congress.164 But it would be a mistake to conclude that
162. The most famous study of unlawful employer interference with NLRB elections is discussed
and defended in Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1015, 1019-24 (1991) (estimating that an employee was unlawfully discharged in one of every
three representation elections conducted by the NLRB during the 1980s). In that connection, see Robert
J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance of
Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 990-91, 994 (1991) (criticizing Weiler's study and putting
the figure for 1980 at one in five elections, but conceding that the ratio was close to one-in-three by the
latter half of that decade). For more recent surveys, see KATE BRONFENBRENNER, UNEASY TERRAIN:
THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL MOBILITY ON WORKERS, WAGES, AND UNION ORGANIZING 43 (2000),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context-=reports (analyzing data
from 400 NLRB-conducted election campaigns from 1998 to 1999 and finding that employers fired
union supporters in one out of four campaigns); CHIRAG MEHTA & NIK THEODORE, UNDERMINING THE
RIGHT TO ORGANIZE: EMPLOYER BEHAVIOR DURING UNION REPRESENTATION CAMPAIGNS 5 (2005),
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/docUploads/ UROCUEDcompressedfullreport%2Epdf (analyzing
data from sixty-two NLRB-conducted election campaigns in Chicago during 2002 and finding that 30%
of the employers fired workers for engaging in union activity). For a recent and all-too-typical account
of an unlawful antiunion campaign-and the NLRB's ineffectiveness in dealing with it-see Steven
Greenhouse, Union Takes New Tack in Organizing Effort at Pork-Processing Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 2006 at A16 (describing how union lost NLRB-conducted election in 1997 and secured reversal of
the result by the agency seven years later on the basis of employer's unlawful discharges and threats
against union supporters).
163. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 162 (reporting that after unsatisfactory experience with
NLRB election procedures, union commenced campaign with support of local clergy, civil rights
groups, and students to pressure employer into entering a "neutrality" agreement); Steven Greenhouse,
Union Claims Texas Victory with Janitors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005 at Al (using card-check
recognition agreement, SEIU organized 5000 janitors working for various building services companies
in Houston).
164. On March 1, 2007, shortly before this Article went to press, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed the Employee Free Choice Act, which would among other things require employers to recognize
and bargain with unions on the basis of signed authorizations. See Steven Greenhouse, House Passes
Bill That Helps Unions Organize, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2007, at A14 (noting bill's uncertain prospects in
the Senate and in the face of a likely Presidential veto). On the debate among union and employer
organizations, see, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Employers Sharply Criticize Shift in Unionizing Method to
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contemporary labor unions are therefore avoiding recourse to the law
altogether. In fact, they are deploying not just labor law but also
employment discrimination and especially employment law in a variety of
ways designed to buttress their novel organizing strategies. I will refer to
this emerging phenomenon as "the strategic deployment of law," and it is
yet another source of the functional integration of work law we are
exploring in this part of the Article.
Thus, while unions are avoiding the NLRB's election processes, they
are nevertheless continuing to use the agency's unfair labor practice
procedures, filing charges against employers who fire union supporters
and/or engage in other anti-union conduct that violates the NLRA. The
point of such filings is not, however, primarily to secure a legal remedy for
the misconduct in question-a remedy that will, after all, typically require a
three-year wait and is likely to consist almost entirely of an agency or court
order instructing the employer to behave better next time-but instead to
aid the current organizing effort in at least three ways.
First, while NLRB remedies take years to secure, an unfair labor
practice complaint-the labor law equivalent of an indictment issued after
investigation of the charges by one of the agency's regional offices-will
ordinarily issue in a matter of weeks or months, and the attendant publicity
is a public relations boon to the organizers, eliminating the "he said/she
said" quality of public debate about the campaign and placing the federal
agency charged with protecting the organizing rights of U.S. workers
squarely on the side of the union. As a tool for mobilizing public
sentiment-and for moving local public officials and business leaders either
to neutrality or even to a union-sympathetic stance-the complaint is
second only to the prospect of an unfair labor practice hearing that will
enable the employees in question to tell their stories of employer
intimidation and retaliation in a public forum, often to the attentive ears of
the local press.
Second, labor organizers file unfair labor practice charges to establish a
predicate for mounting strikes and/or picketing that enjoy considerable
immunity against employer countermeasures ordinarily available to thwart
them. Unlike recognitional picketing-which can only be conducted for a
30-day period unless the union files an election petition, lest the union face
the threat of an immediate injunction bringing it to a halt-unfair labor
practice picketing can proceed virtually without limit.'65 And unlike
Cards From Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006 at A9. For an excellent overview of the scholarly
debate and an analysis supporting the card check device, see James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements
and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819 (2005).
165. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(7)(C), 10(l), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C), 160(l) (2005)
(establishing thirty day limit on recognitional picketing and providing for immediate injunctive relief in
the event of a violation). On the inapplicability of those provisions to unfair labor practice picketing,
see ABA, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW ch. 21 § 1I.B (Pat Hardin & John Higgins eds., 4th ed. 2001 &
Supp. 2003).
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employees engaged in most other kinds of strikes, who can be "permanently
replaced" by the employer during the course of the strike, unfair labor
practice strikers are entitled to return to their jobs the moment the strike is
over. 1
66
To be sure, the tactic is not without its risks. The employer can play
"chicken" and refuse to reinstate the strikers, and, at the end of the day, the
adjudicatory arm of the NLRB may dismiss the complaint, and the strike-
together with the picketing-will lose the protections afforded by unfair
labor practice status retroactively. But that strategy holds considerable risks
for the employer as well-risks of adverse publicity over its refusal to
rehire a mass of returning strikers as well as the possibility of having to
provide backpay for all of them-and in any event the adjudicatory results
are extremely likely to arrive far too late to be of any use to the employer in
the midst of the strike and picketing.
The third and final effect of filing unfair labor practice charges has a
rather different audience: the workers whom the union is attempting to
organize. Although the NLRB does everything institutionally possible to
facilitate the filing of unfair labor practice charges by the untutored
(including designating an "officer of the day" in each of its regional offices
whose job it is to assist "walk-ins" with filling out the necessary paperwork
in a proper manner and providing multilingual assistance for those who
require it), it can be a surprisingly daunting task to undertake this effort on
one's own, since it requires (a) knowledge that an employer's antiunion
conduct actually violates the law and that the NLRB is the agency
responsible for dealing with such violations; (b) access to information about
the location of the nearest NLRB office, an easy thing for employees with
access to the Internet or if you know where to look in what passes for a
phone book these days, but may be surprisingly difficult if you try to secure
this information by dialing 411167; (c) comfort with the prospect of passing
through a multitude of armed guards and an airport-style screening process
in the lobby of the local federal services building; and (d) secure enough
about your own immigration status (no small thing even for legal
immigrants in post-9/11 America) to seek out government assistance in the
first place. In this setting, ready access to a union representative who can
assist you in negotiating this unfamiliar terrain-and who indeed can advise
you of your rights to do so in the first place-provides a powerful first-hand
demonstration of the utility of union representation in enforcing rights and
protections for U.S. employees that otherwise exist mostly on paper.
Although I have focused thus far on the strategic deployment of unfair
labor practice charges-a product of American labor law--contemporary
166. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 165, at ch. 19 § I.B.
167. As it happens, I had the occasion to try to make that call on two occasions during the spring of
2006, and in each case the operator was unable to locate a number for the Miami office of the NLRB.
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unions are increasingly using non-labor law claims to much the same effect,
simultaneously generating additional pressures on the employer through
publicity and threatened liability while demonstrating the utility of union
representation to the employees in question. Such efforts have focused on
discrimination claims (a development obviously tailored to the
demographics of the groups principally targeted by contemporary
organizing campaigns) and with increasing frequency on wage and hour, 168
health and safety, 169 and other employment law claims that address some of
the most pressing needs and interests of low-wage workers.170
To be sure, the labor movement has long played an important role in
securing and defending employment law reform legislation, and that role
continues to this day. 7' Moreover, in the past decade or so, unions have
increasingly sought recourse to employment law rights in their
representation efforts. 172 But the strategic use of non-labor law claims as an
organizing tool has intensified the interaction of unions and employment
law, providing one more example of the functional integration of work law
we are exploring here.
168. See, e.g., Employers Facing 'Huge Upsurge' in Plaintiffs' Wage-Hour Class Actions, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA), Apr. 2, 2001, at C-I (reporting that FLSA enforcement actions had become a "major
component" of organizing strategies by United Food and Commercial Workers Union); Steven
Greenhouse, Among Janitors, Labor Violations Go with the Job, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at Al
(reporting $22.4 million settlement between California's three largest supermarket chains and a class of
2,000 janitors; Service Employees International Union had assisted the workers in bringing the suit "as
part of a strategy to pressure contractors to improve wages, to publicize bad working conditions, and to
advance its efforts to unionize tens of thousands of janitors"); Steven Greenhouse, In Modern Rarity,
Workers Form Union at Small Chain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, § 1 at 29 (reporting that retail shoe
chain signed neutrality agreement after multiple wage and hour violations were used to garner public
support for a threatened boycott and to persuade state attorney general to threaten legal proceedings).
169. See, e.g., Karin Rives, Safety Snags at Pork Plant, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug.
24, 2005, at DI (describing a union helping workers to file unfair labor practice charges challenging
retaliation against workers who complained about safety issues in the plant); Kristin Collins, Meat Plant
in Bladen Criticized, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 26, 2005, at B1 (reporting that union
organizing plant secured report from Human Rights Watch condemning employer for unsafe practices
and resulting injuries).
170. See, e.g., DOL to Provide $6.5 Million in Training Funds to Settle Claims Brought by Texas
Workers, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Jan. 5, 2006 (describing settlement of suit brought by worker
advocacy group challenging failure of DOL to provide proper training for Spanish-speaking workers
who lost their jobs because of increased inter-American trade); see generally Catherine L. Fisk, Union
Lawyers and Employment Law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 57 (2002).
171. See, e.g., Michael Barbaro, Maryland Sets a Health Cost for Wal-Mart, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2006, at AI (under new state law, employers with 10,000 or more employees required to spend at least
8% of payroll costs on health insurance or pay difference into state Medicaid fund; enactment
"underscored the success of the union campaign to turn Wal-Mart into a symbol of what is wrong in the
American health care system"); Retail Industry Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 920 (4th
Cir. Jan. 17, 2007) (2-1 decision holding statute pre-empted under ERISA).
172. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, Why Labor Unions Must (and Can) Survive, I U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 15 (1998); Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L.
REV. 169 (1991).
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3. A Case Study
As it happens, in 2005-06 the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU)-one of the five "Change to Win" unions that recently broke away
from the AFL-CIO to pursue a more aggressive organizing strategy-
conducted a successful union campaign among the janitors and
groundskeepers working at the University of Miami (UM), my home
institution until this past summer.'73  The workers in question are
technically employed by Unicco, a facility services contractor of national
prominence hired by the University to provide custodial and landscaping
services on its campuses, and the campaign shared all of the characteristics
of contemporary organizing, from an escalating corporate campaign
mounted against the University to the SEIU's quest for card check
recognition instead of an NLRB election.
Two features of the campaign are of particular relevance to my claims
about functional integration and thus deserve mention here. First, the
employees in question are overwhelmingly Hispanic (and especially Cuban-
American), Caribbean, and African-American-and predominantly
female-and the organizing strategies the union used reflected
characteristics associated with the cultures in question. Rallies featured a
cacophony of salsa, steel drums, and simultaneous translation that give
them the flavor of a street fair on Calle Ocho or in Miami's Little Haiti.
And in a nod to the strong religious sentiments of many of these employees,
local clergy played a crucial role in the campaign-holding services for the
employees; holding press conferences and placing ads in local papers;
opening a chapel to the workers for use as a "strike sanctuary" on the UM
campus; and, most dramatically, participating in acts of civil disobedience
(including a takeover of the University's admissions office and a human
chain blocking traffic near campus) in support of the workers' cause.
Moreover, in the course of the campaign the SEIU deployed law-
labor law as well as non-labor law-in the strategic manner described in the
previous section. Thus, in widely publicized moves, the union assisted
several workers on the UM medical campus in filing charges with OSHA
challenging the adequacy of precautions and training for dealing with
hazardous materials in UM's medical facilities, and likewise filed charges
alleging that the workers on that campus were receiving less than the pay
and benefits required by the county's living wage ordinance. 74 And the
173. For the record, I was actively involved in campus efforts to support the campaign, and I
describe that involvement in some detail in Richard Michael Fischl, The Other Side of the Picket Line:
Contract, Democracy, and Power in a Law School Classroom, N.Y.U. REV. OF LAW & SOC. CHANGE
(forthcoming 2007). See also Richard Michael Fischl, The Right of Self-Organization and the Strategic
Deployment of Law (forthcoming 2007) (analyzing SEIU's legal strategies at greater length).
174. See Niala Boodhoo, Janitors Complain of Toxic Exposure, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 23, 2005, at
IC; Union Accuses UNICCO of Violating Wage Rules, S. FLA. BUS. J., Mar. 21, 2006, available at
http://southflorida.bizjoumals.com/southflorida/stories/2006/03/20/daily l5.html.
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NLRB's decision to issue an unfair labor practice complaint in late
January-accusing Unicco of spying on a union meeting, interrogating
workers, and making various threats against the union supporters-enabled
the union to ramp up its publicity campaign and at the same time to
commence a strike and picketing that brought considerable pressure on the
University and Unicco alike. By early May, Unicco had agreed to
recognize the SEIU on the janitors' terms-i.e., on the basis of the workers'
signatures rather than an NLRB-conducted election-long before either the
NLRB or the other agencies had even had the chance to commence hearings
on the various charges. "'
4. Implications for the Accelerating Integration of Work Law
The assumption of a central civil rights role for the American labor
movement and the increasing deployment of law from outside the labor area
in support of its organizing efforts accounts in no small measure for some
of the instances of doctrinal integration we saw in Part II of this Article.
For one thing, with American unions engaged in organizing with an
aggressiveness not seen in decades-and with American employers more
willing than ever to fire union supporters-the incidence of unlawful
retaliatory discharge has increased substantially and is likely to continue to
do so for the foreseeable future. The principal recourse for the discharged
organizers is via an unfair labor practice proceeding before the NLRB, and
in that setting-where there is no union contract to provide "just cause"
protection-the employment-at-will rule plays much the same role as it
does in discrimination cases, and it's not a pretty one.'76 Moreover, the
potential availability of multiple sources of protection for protest
activities-sources from labor law as well as employment discrimination
and employment law-enables organizers and workers to make strategic
decisions about how to shape and characterize protest activities, an
important factor in the increasing doctrinal integration of workplace protest
law. 177  Indeed, surely the most important implication of these
developments for the integration of American work law is the increasing
role played by unions in the strategic deployment of laws exogenous to the
NLRA; it simply ain't your grandfather's labor law out there anymore
either.
175. See Steven Greenhouse, Walkout Ends at U. of Miami as Janitors' Pact is Reached, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 2006, at A15.
176. See Fischl, Workplace Justice, supra note 16, at 261-69.
177. See supra Part 1I.B.
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IV.
CONCLUSION: RETHINKING THE TRIPARTITE DIVISION
OF AMERICAN WORK LAW
So what happens when we continue to view an increasingly integrating
world of work law through the discrete lenses of employment
discrimination, labor law, and employment law?
For one thing, we limit ourselves to a partial picture of a growing
number of significant work law topics, from sexual harassment to
mandatory individual arbitration. Simply put, no lawyer would be
adequately prepared for a case involving any of those topics if she limited
herself to materials from only one of the conventional subjects, and a full
grasp is not likely to be facilitated simply by cobbling together multiple
partial understandings. Indeed, we saw many cases in which it is the
interaction and interplay of the different bodies of law-such as
employment-at-will and employment discrimination law, or sexual
harassment and tort law-that governs the field.
Likewise, one cannot fully grasp the role of contemporary employment
discrimination law without taking into account the part it plays in resolving
workplace disputes over individual discharges; one cannot fully grasp the
role of contemporary labor unions without taking a hard look at whom they
are organizing and what strategies they are deploying in doing so; and one
cannot fully grasp the contemporary functions of either employment
discrimination litigation or labor unions without exploring the important
role that employment law doctrines play in connection with each.
Other salient features of the contemporary world of work are likely to
be obscured as well. Some of those features are of relatively recent vintage,
notably the multitude of changes we associate with the concept of
"globalization"---developments with respect to labor markets, production
practices, and the regulatory capacity of the nation-state. 78 Some of those
features have been intensified by globalization but have been with us for
some time, notably the daunting challenges faced by those whose
participation in the paid labor market must by force of circumstance
compete with "care work" obligations (child care, elder care, housework,
and the like).'79 To be sure, these features have particular implications for
employment discrimination, labor law, and employment law respectively,
but when we attempt to examine them via the individual disciplinary
categories we run the risk of missing the bigger picture in the manner of the
blindfolded man who mistakes the elephant's tail for a snake. Indeed,
against the backdrop of the accelerating integration of those previously
discrete fields, we run the risk of getting the snake wrong too.
178. See generally STONE, supra note 101.
179. See generally LABOUR LAW, WORK, AND FAMILY, supra note 5.
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But it seems to me that the greatest danger lies in the messages
unwittingly conveyed by the conventional separation of employment
discrimination from labor law-i.e., that workers can organize or sue but
not both, and that the struggle for workplace equality has little to do with
the struggle for workplace democracy. Important recent developments
suggest that the opposite is increasingly the case, and we ought to treat that
as the starting point for the project of rethinking American work law in a
new century.
